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ABSTRACT
Compliance law theory is incomplete and in a conceptually
disconnected state. This article seeks to offer clarification to this seemingly
disparate yet growing and vitally important area of legal practice and
scholarship. A robust theory of compliance that seeks to better explain and
predict compliance-related outcomes is introduced through compliance
systems theory. The systems theory of compliance conceptualizes the
various actors, institutions and relations that impact compliance practices.
Currently, compliance is viewed as a process and this yields inadequate
explanatory and predictive power. The behavior and practices of each
conceptualized unit in the compliance system, comprising regulators, firms,
executives and inter-organizational structures are analyzed in reference to
two major forces acting at each level: economic and non-economic
institutional forces. These forces impact each unit and help explain
compliance-related behavior across all levels within the system. This
descriptive theoretical analysis in turn, yields insights and prescriptive
recommendations that will help improve compliance law, theory and
practice.
Part I discusses compliance in practice and compliance law. This
section details the struggle of compliance law to stand as its own field in
light of scholarly critiques to define it otherwise. This section also provides
a model for evaluating compliance law under the current limited processbased viewpoint. Part II offers a structural-realist view of compliance
practice and law. This section details a compliance case study involving MF
Global to reinforce the complex realities of the subject. From this vantage
point, compliance law and practice are regarded as complex, multi-actor and
interconnected aspects of a general system. Part III introduces the systems
theory of compliance and advances arguments to support why this theoretical
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model offers robust explanatory and predictive power. Part IV offers a
prescriptive legal and policy analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Compliance law is under-theorized.1 As a result, scholarly analysis of
compliance fails to provide generalizable principles and the writings on the
topic, mirroring the state of the law, tend to be focused on discrete topics that
view compliance as a reactionary process driven by regulation and external
forces such as politics.2 The practice of compliance, likewise, follows this
fragmented and process-driven approach.3 This article will examine these
shortcomings and offers a systems theory of compliance law and practice
that integrates, in a novel way, research from the fields of corporate
governance, behavioral ethics, transaction cost economics, administrative
law and regulatory arbitrage. The article begins with a descriptive account
1. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2075, 2081 (2016) (commenting how compliance law is undertheorized).
2. See infra section I.B.; Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1010 (2017) (stating that “[t]here is no formal statute or regulation
that requires firms to engage in comprehensive compliance efforts. Instead, there are specific
statutory and regulatory admonishments that require firms within certain industries to
implement discrete compliance programs.”). Some scholars focus on the internal aspects of
compliance within firms. See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 933, 939 (2017) (articulating a framework that characterizes the important
components of compliance programs within firms); Veronica Root, The Compliance Process,
94 IND. L.J. 203, 219–27 (2019) (distilling a four-stage compliance process that utilizes
process frame analysis); Veronica Root, Complex Compliance Investigations, COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (focusing “on the detection and investigative stages [of compliance] and the
continuum between them. [Also, demonstrating that] many recent compliance failures within
organizations might have been avoided if more robust processes—meaning the actions,
practices, and routines that firms can employ to communicate and analyze information—had
been in place to ensure investigations were conducted in a manner that allowed the firm to
analyze information from diverse areas within the firm.”); Todd Haugh, Nudging Corporate
Compliance, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 683–741 (2017) (providing a detailed analysis of the role
behavioral ethics as a form of nudging in corporate compliance). As Professor Haugh states
“[i]n many ways, then, achieving the goals of corporate compliance is dependent on the
behavior of individual officers, managers, and employees within the corporation.” Id. at 704;
other scholars focus their attention on compliance as an aspect of corporate governance. See
Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial
Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING
CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 62–86 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E.
Barkow eds., 2011) (highlighting scholarship in criminal law acting as a reactionary force in
relation to corporate conduct); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and
Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 15 (2014) (citing an example of academic work focused on prosecutorial actions
concerning corporate governance).
3. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 2016 - LAYING A
STRATEGIC FOUNDATION FOR STRONG COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT 11 (2016), https://ww
w.pwc.se/sv/pdf-reports/state-of-compliance-study-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/366X-9U2S]
(displaying a compliance framework that is broken down into different elements to
accomplish different strategies).
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of the systems theory of compliance law and ends with the normative
implications derived from the theoretical analysis. The systems theory is
useful insofar as it provides explanatory and predictive power that is
currently lacking in compliance theory.
This article introduces a systems theory of compliance law. A
generalized theory of compliance law is necessary since the demands on
organizations to invest in their compliance functions have been rapidly
increasing during the past two decades, as are the risks associated with
failing to meet those demands.4 The fact is that compliance has, within a
relatively short period of time, occupied a central position within regulatory
and corporate law matters.5
Take the example of Facebook, which has faced existential threats
directly related to compliance law. In 2018, a major compliance-related
threat to that company occurred when the political consultancy firm
Cambridge Analytica was granted unauthorized access to millions of
Facebook users’ personal data.6 The fallout from that scandal resulted in the
public’s loss of trust in the company, congressional hearings, increased
regulatory oversight and lawsuits.7
Yet another major compliance-related challenge arose at Facebook

4. DELOITTE, MEETING COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES: LEVERAGING THE VALUE OF
OUTSOURCING 1, 3 (2013), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/regulatory/articles/manag
ed-regulatory-compliance-services.html [https://perma.cc/A5UJ-UTDJ].
5. See Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 2, at 1004 (stating that
“[c]ompliance is king, and its subjects—regulators, prosecutors, courts, corporations, and
academics—are quick to tout its power and potential for good”); Griffith, supra note 1, at
2077 (identifying how “American corporations have witnessed the dawn of a new era: the era
of compliance”).
6. See Kartikay Mehrotra & Aoife White, Facebook Faces Lawsuit for Data Breach
Affecting Nearly 30 Million Users, INS. J. (June 24, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2019/06/24/530247.htm [https://perma.cc/LMJ8-X6ED] (stating that “[t]he
company’s disclosure in September that hackers exploited several software bugs to obtain
login access to accounts was tagged as Facebook’s worst security breach ever”).
7. Regulatory oversight increasingly involves regulatory agencies pursuing civil
remedies and working in conjunction with criminal prosecutors. See Todd Haugh, The
Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1221 (2017) (discussing how
corporate compliance is becoming increasingly criminalized); Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss at 17, Echavarria v. Facebook, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-05982
(N.D. Cal. June 21, 2019) (denying Facebook’s motion to dismiss because, according to U.S.
District Judge William Alsup, “[f]rom a policy standpoint, to hold that Facebook has no duty
of care here ‘would create perverse incentives for businesses who profit off the use of
consumers’ personal data to turn a blind eye and ignore known security risks’”); Tony Romm,
FTC Votes to Approve $5 Billion Settlement with Facebook in Privacy Probe, WASH. POST
(July 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/12/ftc-votes-approvebillion-settlement-with-facebook-privacy-probe/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5ee8252e5046
(referencing Facebook’s settlement in light of the Privacy Probe).
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when it announced plans to introduce its own cryptocurrency called Libra.8
The fate of this ambitious and potentially transformative project will largely
rest on the company’s ability to comply with a whole host of financial
regulations that can potentially derail this undertaking.9 Facebook, however,
is not alone in its continuous struggle to adequately address compliancerelated issues. Companies large and small and across virtually every sector
face compliance-related threats and opportunities of varying degrees and
scale.10
In the wake of headline-generating corporate scandals, a body of
compliance-related law has emerged with attendant statutes, regulations,
judicial precedent and norms of behavior.11 Scholars have increasingly
commented on the subject of compliance.12 Thriving associations such as
the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics service professionals who
practice compliance across various areas.13 Academic institutions likewise
have taken an interest in the subject and a growing number offer courses or
programs related to compliance law.14
8. Clare Duffy, Facebook Wants to Make Cryptocurrency Mainstream. Here’s How,
CNN (June 19, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/18/tech/facebook-libra-cryptocurrency/
index.html [https://perma.cc/83RB-F35X].
9. Christopher Carbone, Facebook Says Cryptocurrency Libra Won’t Happen Without
‘Full Government Approval’ Amid Broad Resistance, FOX NEWS (July 16, 2019), https://ww
w.foxnews.com/tech/facebook-cryptocurrency-libra-wont-happen-without-full-governmentapproval [https://perma.cc/UL9B-RGB8].
10. See Root, The Compliance Process, supra note 2, at 209 (noting that “[t]oday’s
organizations are responsible for ensuring proper compliance in many different areas”).
11. Id. at 214.
12. D. Daniel Sokol, Teaching Compliance, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 399, 399 (2016); see
Geoffrey Parsons Miller, Compliance: Past, Present and Future, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 437, 438
(2017) (highlighting scholarship on compliance); Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park,
Organic Corporate Governance, 59 B.C. L. REV. 21, 44–45 (2018) (stating that “[t]he
influence of the compliance function on corporate decision-making has become so significant
that it has prompted legal scholars to declare compliance ‘the new corporate governance’ and
‘a universal corporate governance activity’”). Also, the shift toward greater compliancerelated activities within organizations may be due to heightened levels of corporate criminal
liability and enforcement. This liability regime has shifted to one that is duty-based and
dependent on the effectiveness of corporate compliance programs in response to the Federal
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines that incentivize such programs. See Cunningham,
supra note 2, at 15 (describing the shift towards a duty-based approach to liability after the
implementation of the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines).
13. SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE ETHICS & HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE ASS’N, 2017
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2017), https://assets.corporatecompliance.org/Portals/1/PDF/AboutSCC
E/scce-hcca-2018-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVT3-Z9RL].
14. See, e.g., Sokol, supra note 12, at 399–400 (noting the “supply side response” of law
schools to the increased hiring of lawyers in the compliance field, including the development
of compliance certificates or degrees); Mikhail Reider-Gordon & Elena Helmer, Training the
Next Generation of Anti-Corruption Enforcers: International Anti-Corruption Curriculum in
U.S. Law Schools, 14 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 179 (2015) (discussing the efforts of several law
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The expected result is that an improved understanding of the forces that
influence compliance law will result in better-informed policy and practice.
This, in turn, matters since compliance failures exact a significant toll on
society.15 Many small-magnitude compliance failures point to a general
weakness in the deterrent aspects of the law. Larger compliance failures
create systemic risks and reactionary policy adjustments that often result in
suboptimal regulation for an entire industry.16 Compliance failures have real
costs and cause damage to property, the environment, trust in the
marketplace and in some cases individual autonomy and safety.17
This work also contributes to a growing scholarly debate about the
appropriate levels of expenditures in compliance and its intrusion into
corporate governance affairs. Prominent scholars question the need and
efficacy of compliance-related activities and the use of regulatory
enforcement tools such as deferred prosecution agreements that intrude into
internal corporate governance matters.18 The systems theory of compliance
described in this article addresses many of these important questions and
offers several prescriptions. For example, an insight gained from the systems
theory is that regulatory and enforcement actions are best tailored by
weighing economic and institutional forces that impact the interrelated
practices of regulators, firms, executives and inter-organizational structures.
As described below, the current state of compliance law is a mélange
of disparate and unrelated state and federal laws, regulations and precedent
schools in creating compliance-based curriculum); Julie DiMauro, U.S. Compliance
Education Expands as Demand Increases, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/fi
nancial-regulatory-forum/2014/12/03/u-s-compliance-education-expands-as-demand-increas
es-part-one-law-schools/ [https://perma.cc/C5MH-FMFW] (discussing the efforts of law
schools to develop compliance curricula in response to the increased employment in this
sector).
15. See Root, The Compliance Process, supra note 2, at 210 (discussing the negative
consequences of compliance failures).
16. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 89 (2003) (explaining that
legislation following a crash can harm executive officers and firms that are risk-seeking rather
than risk-averse); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1587–90 (2005) (noting that Sarbanes–Oxley
created differing burdens on smaller firms compared with larger firms).
17. British Petroleum’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Volkswagen’s emission
regulations cheating scandal and the fraudulent opening of fake bank accounts at Wells Fargo
are just some of the more prominent recent examples of compliance failures with significant
social costs.
18. See Jenifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through
Nonprosecution, 84 CHI. L. REV. 323 (2017) (discussing the transformation in corporate
criminal enforcement policy); Miriam H. Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1036,
1036 (2008) (indicating that firms will over-invest in compliance to avoid formal criminal
charges even if this practice is inefficient); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organization Misconduct:
Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 591–96 (2005) (questioning
whether compliance programs are effective at all).
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related to a dizzying array of topics.19 Scholars, however, argue that
compliance law merits its own separate classification as a discipline.20 In
some ways, the debate is similar to the claims made about cyberlaw when
this topical area exhibited rapid growth during the early days of the Internet.
Many thought cyberlaw would stand as its own discipline whereas others
argued it lacked the requisite level of general unifying principles.21 As
discussed below, compliance law will thrive as a discipline if it is positioned
within a general theory, such as the systems theory.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses compliance in practice
and what is called compliance law. This section details the struggle of
compliance law to stand as its own field in light of scholarly critiques to
define it otherwise. This section also provides a model for evaluating
compliance law under the current limited viewpoint. Part II offers a
structural-realist view of compliance practice and law. This section details
a compliance case study involving MF Global to reinforce the complex
realities of the subject. From this vantage point, compliance law and practice
are regarded as complex, multi-actor and interconnected aspects of a general
system. Part III introduces the systems theory of compliance and advances
arguments to support why this theoretical model offers robust explanatory
and predictive power. Part IV offers a prescriptive analysis. After this
section, the article concludes.
I. COMPLIANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
To develop a robust theory of compliance law, it is important to
conceptually define and disentangle the law of compliance from compliance
practice, which has been defined as “the processes by which an organization
seeks to ensure that employees and other constituents conform to applicable
norms—which can include either the requirements of laws or regulations or

19. The compliance literature mainly focuses on federal law. Yet, state law is vital and
parallels federal law in substance and structure. The theory proffered here applies equally to
federal and state compliance issues.
20. See Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 338 (2017) (noting that a “growing array of
regulatory mandates and modes of regulatory enforcement” has contributed to compliance as
a significant area of focus for legal and business activity and academic and industry-related
interest); Jennifer M. Pacella, The Regulation of Lawyers in Compliance (Kelley Sch. of Bus.,
Res. Paper No. 19-37, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3430093
[https://perma.cc/J425-G5CL] (analyzing the role of lawyers in compliance functions and
proposing reforms to current regulatory models).
21. See Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1149
(2000) (arguing that cyberlaw is not its own body of law but rather reflects preexisting legal
issues).
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the internal rules of the organization.”22 This section offers a delineation of
these two areas and then offers a model to illustrate how compliance law is
currently assessed, albeit in a fairly crude manner, through a reactionaryprocess viewpoint.
As alluded to above, compliance practice includes the norms, internal
company regulations and policies, governance mechanisms, resources and
personnel used by a firm to adhere to what the firm interprets is the
appropriate response to existing laws and regulations. Compliance is,
therefore, the firm’s practice of compliance broadly construed. The law of
compliance, however, includes the legislation, caselaw and administrative
regulations that govern what the firm may or may not do, the mechanics of
enforcement and prosecution and the penalties that may apply in the event
of a violation. The systems theory of compliance law will address both
aspects of compliance since the field cannot be properly understood without
reference to each aspect of the system and their relation to one another.
A. Compliance as a Field of Research and Practice
Some scholars claim that compliance law is its own field and that its
importance is growing.23 The American Law Institute (ALI) recently
promulgated a tentative draft of their Principles of the Law of Compliance,
Risk Management and Enforcement.24 The ALI’s efforts are to be lauded as
an important step to distill basic concepts related to the subject of compliance
law, however the principles are mainly a distillation of best practices, not a
cohesive theory that can effectively explain or predict a wide range of
compliance-related behavior.25
Although it is impossible to dispute that the subject has attracted great
interest, the arguments in favor of labeling compliance law as a distinct field
22. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE 3 (2014). See Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 949, 958 (2009) (defining compliance as a “system of policies and controls that
organizations adopt to deter violations of law and to assure external authorities that they are
taking steps to deter violations of law.”); Griffith, supra note 1, at 2082 (defining compliance
as “the set of internal processes used by firms to adapt behavior to applicable norms”).
23. Miller, supra note 12, at 437 (stating that “[c]ompliance, once a virtually unknown
topic, is coming of age as a field of legal practice, as a subject taught in law schools, and as a
field of research and analysis by academics and thoughtful practitioners”). See Bird & Park,
supra note 20 (discussing compliance law as a core concern for corporate governance);
Pacella, supra note 20 (analyzing the role of lawyers in compliance functions and proposing
reforms to current regulatory models).
24. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT § 301
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019).
25. Id. at § 203 cmt. b. (indicating that “[a]ccordingly, the recommendations and
standards set forth in these Principles are general statements of appropriate conduct”).
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are not fully developed. As mentioned earlier, the issue that faces
compliance law appears at first blush to resemble the case of cyberlaw. The
cyberlaw label was applied to various cases arising from the application of
existing legal principles to novel circumstances brought about by web-based
technologies.26 A debate emerged whether cyberlaw existed as its own body
of law or whether it was the application of pre-existing legal principles to
new facts driven by new technologies.27 The scholarly consensus is the latter
because very few bodies of law are defined by technologies. The connections
between law and technology are mediated by social practices and what is
called cyberlaw mainly corresponds to the application of existing legal
doctrines to accommodate new technical scenarios.28
Compliance law differs fundamentally from cyberlaw, however, since
it is not driven by technology. Instead, compliance law is driven by the
reality of heightened regulation across industries and the greater social
demands for companies to observe legal and ethical conduct.29 According to
some scholars, this heightened level of regulation originates from various
sources. Professor Daniel Sokol states:
Compliance, however, means different things to different people
within a company based on factors such as the industry sector and
the particular level of actors within a firm. For some, compliance
relates to only board level issues. For others it relates to senior
managers, mid-level managers, or employees. Compliance risk
may be a function of issues that any company faces (e.g., Sarbanes
Oxley, Dodd-Frank, antitrust, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), data privacy, insider trading, auditing, and tax) or sector
specific issues (e.g., financial services, health care).30
Professor Sokol’s statement highlights a central problem facing the
recognition of compliance law as a distinct field. That is, compliance law is
conceptually muddled and comprised of legal doctrines that are disconnected
and strung together by the need to satisfy heightened levels of regulation.31
26. See JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW – THE LAW OF THE INTERNET (1997)
(describing a resource that provides guidance on legal issues regarding the internet).
27. One infamously critical account equated Cyberlaw with the Law of the Horse. See
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996)
(analyzing whether cyberspace and intellectual property are adequately covered by existing
law).
28. Sommer, supra note 21, at 1145.
29. See, e.g., Teresa Meek, In a Risky World, Chief Compliance Officers Move to Center
Stage, FORBES (May 31, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adp/2017/05/31/in-a-risky-wor
ld-chief-compliance-officers-move-to-center-stage/#5731c6935a3a [https://perma.cc/3N 9H6EMC] (discussing how the “steady rise in regulations” has given way to Chief Compliance
Officers playing crucial roles in companies and industries of all types).
30. Sokol, supra note 12, at 401–02.
31. See Root, The Compliance Process, supra note 2, at 244 (stating that “[t]he field of
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Also, the increased emphasis on civic and corporate social responsibility has
increased the need for firms to invest in sound governance practices and
compliance.32 This may reduce compliance as simply a derivative byproduct
of separate processes external to the firm. According to Professor Sokol, the
current state of teaching compliance reflects this epistemological problem
and is “nothing other than dressed up versions of classes in white collar crime
or regulation or lectures on latest case developments. . . .”33
The principal pedagogical writings in compliance law reflect the
agglomerated and disconnected nature of the field. For example, the first
general compliance law textbook covers such varying and unrelated topics
as: information security, off-label drugs, FCPA, anti-money laundering and
sexual harassment.34 Another resource aimed for practitioners published by
the American Bar Association similarly covers disparate topics such as:
labor, the FCPA, Dodd-Frank/Sarbanes-Oxley financial regulation, health
care, pharmaceutical, medical, and food products, product safety,
environmental regulation, government contracts, nonprofit entities, privacy
and data security.35 Lacking a general framework or theory, compliance law
and pedagogy struggle to be understood beyond the need to comply with
various regulations that are situation-specific and that lack commonality.
Another scholarly critique against compliance law as a separate field is
that it is simply a narrow subset of corporate governance law, which is a
well-developed and comprehensive area of law.36 According to Professor
Lawrence Cunningham, “[t]he subject of compliance is a narrow component
of corporate governance. Its roots are anchored not so much in the corporate
governance movement but in the concurrent intensification of organizational
criminal liability.”37 A contrary viewpoint is that compliance has supplanted
compliance is an emerging one within legal scholarship, but the diversity of issues raised by
compliance may make some wonder whether it truly is its own field”); Victor Fleischer,
Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 237 (2010) (noting that “the administrative state
has increased substantially, and the amount of time lawyers devote to regulatory matters has
grown apace”).
32. E.g., ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 74 (1991)
(implying that in the current reality of corpocracy, there is a growing need for corporate
accountability and sound governance).
33. Sokol, supra note 12, at 400.
34. MILLER, supra note 22.
35. ANDREW S. BOUTROS, T. MARCUS FUNK & JAMES T. O’REILLY, THE ABA
COMPLIANCE OFFICER’S DESKBOOK (2016).
36. Corporate governance is defined by one scholar as: “‘[t]he system of rules, practices
and processes by which a company is directed and controlled.’ It is a broad term applicable
to any business organization. It encompasses a company’s business purpose and the
mechanisms used to achieve that business purpose.” Cunningham, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting
Corporate Governance, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/te rms/
c/corporategovemance.asp [https://perma.cc/W27C-5JPD].
37. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 14.
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corporate governance and brought forth a new era of corporate governance.38
The first argument, however, fails to adequately describe compliance
law since it fails to take into account the richness of the subject and the
diversity of actors involved in compliance. These two aspects of compliance
extend beyond the confines of corporate governance. For example, corporate
governance is largely concerned with the agency costs that impact
stockholders, fiduciaries and agents as well as the market and non-market
mechanisms that economics, regulation, case law and private norms of
behavior produce to increase or reduce agency costs.39 As scholars have
pointed out, however, compliance also relies on risk concepts, ethics and
behavioral attributes that extend to individuals internal and external to the
firm.40 As will be demonstrated by the analysis and generalizations of the
systems theory of compliance, compliance law is a cohesive and broader
subject than corporate governance law.41
B. A Reactionary Process View of Compliance Law
In its current epistemic form, compliance law is viewed by scholars
under what is labeled here as a reactionary process view of private behavior
influenced by external regulation.42 The current theoretical view of
38. Griffith, supra note 1, at 2106–14.
39. See ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 6 (1932) (describing the agency costs that arises from the separation of control and
ownership in corporations); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) (advocating for increasing shareholder power in
order to reduce agency costs).
40. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral Compliance, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018).
41. Corporate governance is a vital element of the systems theory of compliance law as
discussed further below. See infra Section III.C.2. For example, designing internal
compliance structures and incentives within the firm is heavily dependent on governance. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT § 3.01 (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019) (stating that “[f]or example, under a larger for-profit
organization’s compliance governance, a chief compliance officer may be responsible for
designing the compliance program, a chief executive officer decides whether and how to
direct its implementation, and the board of directors approves the implementation and
periodically reviews the program’s effectiveness”).
42. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systematic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019,
1028–29 (2012) (discussing how government intervention in corporate affairs is the result of
legislation that follows in the wake of a scandal or a perceived market failure). Professor
Veronica Root has offered some generalizable aspects of the compliance process as it occurs
within organizations. Her process model advances our understanding of how compliance
works within organizations and as she points out “[w]hen compliance failures are assessed
through a process frame, greater clarity regarding the nature of the compliance program’s
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compliance is generally as a process.43 Under the reactionary process view,
compliance law is also contingent on the dyadic relationship between
regulators and firms. Regulation arises due to the behavior undertaken by
an actor or actors in industry that is deemed socially undesirable. This
behavior must have serious enough consequences that it negatively impacts
public welfare.44 In some cases, the negative behavior is revealed in a way
that draws public attention and scrutiny and is attributable to a regulator,
investigative committee, law enforcement officer, journalist, competitor or
whistleblower.45 This reactionary approach to regulation has been identified
by scholars, particularly in the field of financial regulation.46
In other cases, the public coalesces around a set of values that contradict
the desired actions of the marketplace. For example, higher auto emissions
regulations may result due to a legislative response to public concerns about
global warming, not due to the bad behavior of any specific actor.
Alternatively, the legislative or common law processes may yield new
private rights that create duties and thus constrain commercial activities. For
example, in the Caremark decision the Delaware Court of Chancery altered
the liability for corporate boards that fail to implement an effective
compliance and internal control system.47
The legislature creates statutory law and the courts create precedent.
failure may be discerned.” Root, The Compliance Process, supra note 2, at 205.
43. See generally Root, The Compliance Process, supra note 2 (referring to compliance
as a process); Griffith, supra note 2, at 2082 (“More concretely, compliance is the set of
internal processes used by firms to adapt behavior to applicable norms.”); PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT § 3.01 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2019) (“Depending on the kind of organization, its business or affairs, and other
circumstances, compliance and risk management are organizational processes that require
certain organizational actors to perform specific tasks.”).
44. See, e.g., Lydie Pierre Louis, Hedge Fund Fraud and the Public Good, 15 FORDHAM
J. CORP. FIN. L. 21, 90–93 (2009) (advocating for greater hedge fund regulation in light of
major hedge fund-related scandals).
45. See, e.g., Bethany Mclean, How Wells Fargo’s Cutthroat Corporate Culture
Allegedly Drove Bankers to Fraud, VANITY FAIR, June 2017, https://www.vanityfair.co m/ne
ws/2017/05/wells-fargo-corporate-culture-fraud [https://perma.cc/9NLV-L3GS] (describing
how disgruntled former bank employees and investigative journalists exposed the rampart
fraud at Wells Fargo).
46. See Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC at 70: Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds
and Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
Is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 949 (2005) (arguing that “[i]n the absence of
a new crisis involving derivatives, excessive leverage in the market or manipulative activities
by institutional investors, it is unlikely that Congress, the SEC or any other financial regulator
will decide to study and reform institutional investor behavior”); Pierre Louis, supra note 44,
at 41 (recognizing that “[i]n the absence of a crisis . . . it is unlikely the SEC or any other
regulators will move to reform the hedge fund industry”).
47. In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996).
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This is then followed by regulatory action, heightened enforcement and
private ordering behavior that seeks to internalize the new regulations to
comply with the law.48 At this point, industry must find ways to make sense
of the regulation and decide how to best accommodate it within the firm’s
resources and risk appetite.49 Firms then internalize compliance through
various best practices and strategic processes.50 In some cases, resource-rich
firms and trade associations may strategically employ the non-market system
to weaken the heightened requirements of new compliance law.51
The strategic lobbying efforts by firms and trade associations may
weaken several aspects of regulation at the administrative and enforcement
level.52 For example, an administration may favor lessening the impacts and
requirements of regulation in response to industry demands.53 Two recent
examples of this include the curbing of environmental regulations and efforts
to weaken the regulatory oversight power of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.54
48. See Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 379
(2008) (discussing how the DOJ’s budget for corporate fraud investigations increased by
$24.5 million following the establishment of the Corporate Fraud Task Force in 2002).
Sometimes regulation has sweeping consequences that are later deemed an overreaction. See
Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 39, 55 (2009) (noting that “[m]any observers cite Sarbanes-Oxley as illustrating the
kind of dangerous overreaction that crisis-driven legislative and regulatory reform can
pose.”).
49. See Fleischer, supra note 31 (stating that “[r]egulatory arbitrage is a consequence of
a legal system with generally applicable laws that purport to define, in advance, how the legal
system will treat transactions that fit within defined legal forms. Because the legal definition
cannot precisely track the underlying economic relationship between the parties, gaps arise,
and these gaps create opportunities.”).
50. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
ENFORCEMENT (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019) (listing best practices for
compliance and risk management).
51. Katy Milani, Latest Assault on Dodd-Frank Has Bank Lobbyists Beaming, THE HILL
(Mar. 5, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/376749-latest-assault-on-dodd-frank-hasbank-lobbyists-beaming [https://perma.cc/Q5CD-JC4K].
52. See Nicholas Confessore & Cecilia Kang, Facebook Data Scandals Stoke Criticism
that a Privacy Watchdog Too Rarely Bites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2018 (discussing how the
Federal Trade Commission has become subservient to corporate interests such as Big Tech).
53. Milani, supra note 51.
54. See Steve Eder, White House Boasts of Its Savings in Regulatory Rollback, N.Y.
Times, July 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/business/white-house-boasts-ofits-savings-in-regulatory-rollback.html
[https://perma.cc/X9BM-VGL9]
(discussing
criticisms of attempts to rollback government regulations due to their effect on the
environment); Lalita Clozel, CFPB Acting Chief Asks Staff to Cut Budget by 20%, WALL ST.
J., June 12, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-acting-chief-asks-staff-to-cut-budget-by
-20-1528842446 (discussing cuts in the CFPB’s fiscal spending for 2019). The CFPB was
widely lauded as a much-needed watchdog to oversee financial institutions and created by the
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Despite industry’s attempts to weaken regulation, the constellation of
harmful corporate behavior has resulted in a dizzying array of regulation.55
Ironically, large incumbent firms in mature industries may benefit from
regulation as a barrier to entry that prevents new entrants from entering a
market. For example, pharmaceutical companies benefit from the extensive
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) clinical trial regulations for new
medical compounds. The result of these regulations, which cost hundreds of
millions of dollars to comply with, is that new entrants to the pharmaceutical
drug manufacturing industry are effectively priced out of the market.56
This process-based view of compliance law, however, yields
unsatisfactory explanatory and predictive power nor does it present a faithful
picture of what occurs in practice. The resulting portrait is a dim view of
compliance law that appears to be ad hoc, reactionary or ex post, distributed
across unrelated domains of business and subject to weakening by strategic
actors. Absent bad behavior that incites public ire, or a change in public
values, the reactionary process view fails to explain the various compliance
scenarios that occur in practice. For example, the MF Global case discussed
in the following section highlights scenarios that involved shared regulatory
authority and overlap, regulatory arbitrage, an aggressive corporate
regulatory strategy and the lack of proper corporate governance controls. All
of these forces, none of which are explained by the process-dominant view
of compliance, played a significant role in the MF Global case study.
Nonetheless, the seeds of a new compliance law era have been sown.57
For example, the emergent scholarly literature increasingly points to
compliance law’s need to focus on extra-legal factors, variables and
institutions.58 As recognized by scholars from other fields, behavior cannot
be properly understood without recognizing the economic and normative
social forces that impact individuals, organizations and institutions.59 These
powerful forces and their impact on compliance law and practice will be
examined next.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
55. See Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing Problem,
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 531 n.10 (2012) (discussing how there are between
10,000–300,000 regulations that expose companies to civil and criminal liability).
56. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 356 (2007) (stating that “FDA regulation does much to
support the profitability of drug development even as it adds to its costs. Like other costly
regulatory regimes, FDA regulation serves as a barrier to entry that protects market
incumbents from competition from new firms.”).
57. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Haugh, supra note 2 (focusing on behavioral ethics); Langevoort, supra
note 2 (emphasizing the components of a successful compliance program).
59. Christine Oliver, Sustainable Competitive Advantage: Combining Institutional and
Resource-Based Views, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 697, 700–08 (1997).
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II. A STRUCTURAL–REALIST VIEW OF COMPLIANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE
The reactionary process view of compliance fails to provide an
adequate theory since it fails to offer generalizable principles that explain
behavior or adequately predict outcomes.60 Yet, a robust theory of
compliance must be able to do so. This section offers insights on the practice
of compliance that inform the realities of this complex area of activity and
describe its multidimensional aspects. This section then outlines the basis
for a theory that examines the legal and extra-legal forces that impact
compliance practices. A theory of compliance that draws from these insights
to connect concepts, actors and relationships within the compliance system
will then be introduced.
A. Overview
Several aspects of compliance must be acknowledged to proceed. First,
practitioners, scholars and policymakers recognize that as a human endeavor,
compliance is never perfectly realized within firms.61 Instead, the practice
of compliance is inherently a probabilistic activity due to administrative
resource constraints, managerial error, misinterpretation and at times
evasion.62
Second, the law and its resulting regulations will have varying degrees
of uncertainty. This may arise from statutory vagueness,63 weak regulatory
60. See Social and Behavioral Theories: 3. Theory and Why It Is Important, ESOURCE:
BEHAV. & SOC. SCI. RES., http://www.esourceresearch.org/eSourceBook/SocialandBehaviora
lTheories/3TheoryandWhyItisImportant/tabid/727/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/CA7R-EE
2U] (last visited Nov. 17, 2019) (defining theory as “a set of interrelated concepts, definitions,
and propositions that explains or predicts events or situations by specifying relations among
variables”).
61. Robert Bird & Stephen Park, An Efficient Investment-Risk Model of Compliance,
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 30, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/11/30/an-ef
ficient-investment-risk-model-of-corporate-compliance/
[https://perma.cc/Q9M4-C4K5]
(recognizing that “[f]rom the moment [a regulation] is enacted, it is already embedded with
imperfections that make full compliance unknowable”); Root, The Compliance Process,
supra note 2, at 216 (explaining that it is commonly understood that it would be inefficient
for firms to attempt to achieve perfect levels of compliance).
62. See Baer, supra note 18, at 1059 (listing ways in which an employee can avoid
detection).
63. Fleischer, supra note 31 (stating that “[t]wo groups within the administrative state,
congressional staff members and agency lawyers, together provide another constraint on
gamesmanship by interpreting ambiguous statutes and conveying the unwritten rules to
interested parties. Because the interpretation of new deal structures is not fixed ex ante,
staffers and agency lawyers often consult with deal lawyers, and such meetings are not
immune from the usual political force of interest groups and their lobbyists.”).
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enforcement,64 overlapping regulatory authority,65 or new market activities
that challenge or fall outside of existing regulations.66 Third, compliance
cannot be divorced from human behavior and this likewise renders the
subject open to various possibilities. As the proponents of legal realism
would claim, the law is a prediction regarding what a court (or regulator) will
do.67
To analogize the gap between behavior and legal formalism in another
area of law, formal contract doctrine often fails to explain contracting
behavior in practice.68 Instead, the relational theory of contracting provides
a much more accurate account of applied contracting behavior.69 The
theoretical foundations of relational contracting and realism have impacted
contract doctrine. For example, one of the crowning achievements of this
modern view of contract theory was the creation and widespread adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code.70
As a behavioral subject, compliance falls within a spectrum of legal and
strategic business behavior and these forces cannot be disregarded if
compliance doctrine is to be understood and improved. As pointed out by
scholars, businesses have varying in-house legal capabilities that are used to

64. See Baer, supra note 18, at 1049 (stating the reality that “[f]ederal prosecutors . . .
lack both the physical and political resources to prosecute every guilty entity.”).
65. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1131–36 (2012) (recognizing that “[m]any areas of regulation and
administration are characterized by fragmented and overlapping delegations of power to
administrative agencies.”).
66. See Jeff Horwitz & Parmy Olson, Facebook Unveils Cryptocurrency Libra in Bid to
Reshape Finance, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-unvei
ls-crypto-wallet-based-on-currency-libra-11560850141
[https://perma.cc/X8YD-579L]
(“Much of Libra’s future could also depend on which U.S. regulatory bodies claim authority
to police it.”).
67. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (“The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law.”).
68. Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 1, 6 (1963) (finding that instead of formal contracting “[b]usinessmen often
prefer to rely on “a man’s word” in a brief letter, a handshake, or “common honesty and
decency”- even when the transaction involves exposure to serious risks”).
69. See IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, 12–
13 (2d ed. 1978) (demonstrating an example of the relational theory of contracting).
70. See James W. Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003) (noting that “the legal principles of the realists, particularly
those implemented in the U.C.C. such as good faith, open-price terms, the flexibility accorded
output and requirements contracts, and the attempt to find a contract where the parties’
expressions of offer and acceptance contradicted each other but their actions show an
agreement to proceed, are the focus of scholarly attention and the model for further expansion
of ‘relational’ principles to non-sales long-term contracts”).
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achieve strategic ends.71 The same is true of the law-dependent field of
compliance. The range of compliance capabilities will vary between
complicit compliance officers who look the other way and enable illegal and
unethical behavior, to those with a formalistic check-the-box mentality, and
those who are forward-looking, preventive and, in some cases, strategic.72
Recognizing the behavioral aspects of compliance law and practice are
critical to develop theory; however, an equally important task is to amplify
the focus of compliance law to include broader aspects of the regulatory
environment. This by necessity amplifies both the scope of analysis and the
examined unit of analysis. From a strictly legal perspective, the unit of
analysis is a regulation and its impact on an economic actor, namely a firm
and its managers. The current state of compliance research, particularly the
strain that emphasizes compliance as a subset of corporate governance,
focuses on this dyadic relationship between regulator and regulated entity.73
The practice and reality of compliance, however, requires the analysis to
expand to include additional interrelated units. These include interorganizational structures such as inter-agency coordination efforts and selfregulatory organizations.
The following case study illustrates the complex and multi-dimensional
aspects of compliance practice and law. The following section analyzes the
downfall of MF Global to illustrate the various aspects of compliance that a
robust compliance theory should take into consideration.
B. Compliance Case Study – MF Global
MF Global was once a prominent commodities broker; however, the
company experienced financial difficulties shortly after its initial public
offering in 2007 due to its overreliance on the brokerage business’ thin
margins, interest rate risk and several compliance failures such as a $141.5

71. See Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 7–8
(2008) (discussing how the use of legal knowledge evolved into playing an active role in the
strategic management of a firm); David Orozco, Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual Property
Management Resource, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 687, 687–94 (2010) (discussing the importance of
legal and managerial knowledge as a source of competitive advantage); Constance E. Bagley,
Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378, 378 (2008)
(articulating the value of legal astuteness within firms).
72. See J.S. Nelson, Disclosure-Driven Crime, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1544 (2019)
(describing how the compliance function at Volkswagen was complicit in hiding information
from regulators); Haugh, supra note 2, at 686 (discussing “behavioral ethics nudging,” a new
trend in corporate compliance strategy, which creates a structured decision-making process to
encourage employees to act ethically).
73. See, e.g., Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 2 (analyzing
government regulatory mechanisms and their effect on corporate compliance).
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million dollar loss caused by a rogue trader.74 In 2010, Jon Corzine, the
former New Jersey governor and senator and once head of Goldman Sachs,
was hired to turn the company’s fortunes around.75
Corzine immediately sought to transform the company into a global
investment bank.76 As a commodities dealer and a brokerage firm, MF
Global was subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), the Securities and Investors Protection Company (SIPC) and selfregulatory organizations such as the Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE)
and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).77
To achieve the goal of transforming the company into an investment
bank, Corzine used his political influence to secure regulatory approval with
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to designate MF Global as a New
York Primary Dealer, a status that would enable the company to deal directly
with the U.S. government to distribute U.S. Treasury debt.78 The Primary
Dealer designation carries financial benefits and is viewed as a strong seal
of approval by regulators and Wall Street. The Federal Reserve somewhat
hastily approved the Primary Dealer designation despite previously denying
MF Global’s application and a warning from regulators at the CFTC that MF
Global lacked proper internal controls as uncovered during a recent
investigation.79
Once he was in place as Chairman and CEO, Corzine failed to

74. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. FINANCIAL SERVICES OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH
CONG., REP. ON MF GLOBAL 1–7 (Comm. print 2012) [hereinafter MF Global House Report].
75. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 27.
77. The SEC, CFTC and SIPC are governmental regulatory agencies. The last two
entities are what are known as self-regulating organizations, or SROs. FINRA regulates all
broker-dealers that interact with the public and derives its authority to do so under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing
Self-Regulatory Organization’s Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 963, 964 (2012) (stating that “FINRA was created pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 . . . which contemplated a system wherein member-owned securities exchanges
and broker-dealer associations would regulate the activities of its member securities firms,
subject to the oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission. . . .”). SROs like FINRA
play an important role in compliance although their role has not been fully examined. See id.
at 963 (stating that “[f]ew issues are as poorly understood and under-theorized as the concept
of ‘industry self-regulation’”).
78. Sarah N. Lynch, A Persistent MF Global Won NY Fed Dealer Status, REUTERS (Dec.
14, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mfglobal-nyfed/a-persistent-mf-global-wonny-fed-dealer-status-idUSTRE7BD2B920111215
[https://perma.cc/UQ7X-MXCA]
(reporting that “[n]ow bankrupt MF Global lobbied the New York Federal Reserve heavily to
become a primary dealer, eventually succeeding after a delay sparked by a regulator flagging
internal control problems”).
79. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 29.
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implement adequate compliance controls from a risk management
perspective and implemented a culture of aggressive risk-taking. Corzine’s
strategy focused on multi-billion dollar purchases of European sovereign
debt.80 These bonds had been trading at a steep discount and under volatility
since the European debt crisis had called into question the ability of certain
countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain to repay their loans.81
In addition, Corzine promoted a company culture that reflected a lack of
accountability and transparency. For example, when the company’s Chief
Risk Officer began to voice concerns about the amount and volatility of
foreign sovereign debt investments pursued by Corzine, Corzine removed
the risk officer from reporting directly to the board and reassigned him to
report into the company’s Chief Operating Officer, who was one of
Corzine’s long-time underling.82 The risk officer was shortly thereafter fired
and replaced.83
The lack of accountability extended up to the board of directors since
they failed to adequately place controls on Corzine’s increasingly risky bets
on European sovereign debt and approved MF Global’s large capital
allocations to fund these investments.84 They also failed to monitor and
correct inadequate risk management procedures, such as the aggressive use
of a riskier method of calculating reserves to protect customers’ brokerage
account funds held in segregated accounts.85 This riskier method was
allowed by the CFTC, although it was not widely employed in the industry,
and was later prohibited by regulators after MF Global’s collapse.86
Adequate supervision by the board would have spotted the increased risk
assumed by this more aggressive reserve calculation method and, given the
high risk of taking such a large position in volatile European debt, it would
have been prudent to switch to the more conservative method. In July 2011,
the company’s CFO produced a memo that suggested the firm could provide
overnight “loans” from the commodities business’ segregated and secured
accounts to be used as working capital for broker-dealer operations in New
80. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 31.
81. Jennifer Rankin, Weakest Eurozone Economies on Long Road to Recovery, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/16/weakest-eu
rozone-portugal-ireland-spain-italy [https://perma.cc/F8HK-AU63].
82. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 37.
83. Id. at 38.
84. Id. at 39–40.
85. See Cause of Action Institute, The Collapse of MF Global: Summary and Analysis 5
(June 25, 2013), https://causeofaction.org/the-collapse-of-mf-global-summary-analysis/ [http
s://perma.cc/GTP9-BQ7H] (noting that “[t]he SIPA Trustee noted in his report that the Alt
Method results in a significantly lower regulatory capital requirement. MF Global’s Secured
Statements on file with their regulators show that the company indeed used the Alt Method
for reporting purposes.”).
86. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 90–92.
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York.87 This was a dramatic change from customary practice and would have
raised a red flag had proper controls been implemented by the board.88
The board and management also failed to properly monitor the
regulatory requirement to increase capital reserves and comply with liquidity
rules triggered by the purchase of the volatile sovereign debt. According to
a congressional investigation report, FINRA disagreed with MF Global’s
assessment that the European sovereign bonds were equivalent to U.S.
treasury debt from a default risk perspective.89 FINRA and the SEC required
MF Global to increase its capital reserves in light of the higher risk of default
related to these bonds. Also, the mandated processes and reports to comply
with liquidity regulations were all performed manually, despite the fact that
a number of compliance officers within the company had requested that the
IT department automate the process.90
When the losses triggered by the high exposure to sovereign debt and
the lack of adequate compliance controls were made public, this compelled
several ratings agencies to downgrade MF Global.91 Counterparties to the
sovereign debt trades then demanded higher margin payments, and
brokerage customers began to withdraw their funds.92 This caused a liquidity
crisis that resulted in rushed and inappropriate fund transfers that drew
money from MF Global customer accounts, violating one of the most
fundamental rules in the industry which is that customer property should
never be co-mingled or used for company purposes.93 When MF Global
declared bankruptcy on October 31, 2011 there was a $1.6 billion dollar
shortfall related to customer funds that were missing since they were
improperly used to repay creditors.94
The MF Global case illustrates how various actors within and outside
of the organization impacted the practice of compliance, ranging from the
board, to its top executives in charge of designing and conceptualizing a
87. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 48–49.
88. See Jonathan Stempel, Corzine, Others Settle MF Global Lawsuit for $64.5 Million,
REUTERS (July 7, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mfglobal-settlement-idUSKCN0
PH1RJ20150707 [https://perma.cc/GYW5-7AWL] (reporting that insurers agreed to settle
claims brought by investors against MF Global executives and directors alleging improper
management).
89. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 52 (stating that “FINRA staff members
responded by noting that MF Global had indicated in its regulatory filings that the company
retained the default risk on its European bonds and that this risk was non-trivial”).
90. Id. at 47.
91. Id. at 56–57.
92. Id. at 59.
93. Id. at 60–61. See Cause of Action Institute, supra note 85, at 7 (“The SIPA trustee
report notes that ‘some personnel at MFGI interpreted the regulations as permitting customer
funds to be used intraday.’”).
94. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 73.
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compliance program, to the officers in charge of executing this program,
including the board, Corzine, the CFO, COO and its Chief Risk Officer.
Also, parties external to the firm such as regulators played a role in the firm’s
collapse.
It is important to highlight that the MF Global case is not meant to
represent an archetypal or representative compliance case study since such a
thing does not exist given the wide diversity of compliance-related issues
and contexts faced by firms. Rather, the case highlights the complexity of
compliance-related issues that should be accounted for by a suitable theory
of compliance law. As discussed below, a theory of compliance law should
take into account the complex reality of compliance practice.95 Before
beginning that discussion, however, the next section discusses how existing
compliance law theory fails to adequately account for MF Global’s failure.
C. Existing Theory’s Inability to Explain the MF Global Failure
On its face, the MF Global case may seem like another example of bad
corporate governance. This viewpoint would support the argument that
compliance law is simply a subset of corporate governance and that it lacks
a rigorous theoretical basis as its own area of scholarship.96 However,
corporate governance failings do not entirely account for MF Global’s
failure. The causal factors behind this massive collapse suggest various
additional forces were at play.
For example, regulatory behavior should be assessed to find out if
regulators played a role that facilitated MF Global’s failure.97 For one, a
congressional subcommittee that investigated the MF Global collapse
offered the following recommendation to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York:
The Subcommittee further recommends that the New York Fed
consider re-examining its primary dealer selection process to
provide for greater scrutiny of companies with questionable
financial health, risk management histories, and ambitious
business strategies. If a company has experienced multi-year
losses, chronic regulatory failures, or is in the process of
implementing a dramatic change in business strategy-red flags that
95. See discussion infra Part III.B.
96. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 14.
97. The case of federal prosecutors aggressively seeking criminal charges against Arthur
Andersen due to the role it played in the Enron scandal is a classic case involving what is
viewed as overly-zealous prosecutorial overreach. See generally James Kelly, The Power of
an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 509 (2006) (discussing
the negative consequences of indicting entire corporations at the expense of thousands of
innocent employees).
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were clearly present during [MF Global’s] application–the New
York Fed should consider prolonging the application process to
better assess how these factors will affect the company’s overall
suitability as a counterparty.98
It is believed that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York accelerated
MF Global’s application to become a primary dealer, which is viewed as a
stamp of approval.99 This imprimatur of legitimacy might have altered the
perception among stakeholders regarding the level of risk inherent within the
company.
The same congressional investigation report also had the following to
say about the CFTC’s allowance of a riskier method to calculate segregated
customer funds:
By permitting [futures merchants] to exclude a customer’s excess
margin funds from the amount that must be set aside in secured
accounts, the Alternative Method is inconsistent with the
Commodity Exchange Act’s “bedrock” customer protection
principle, which “ensure[s] that property entrusted by customers
to their brokers will not be subject to the risks of the broker’s
business” . . . On October 23, 2012, the CFTC announced that it
would be proposing new rules to enhance customer protections by,
among other things, amending Part 30 of its regulations to no
longer permit [futures merchants] to use the Alternative
Method . . . The Subcommittee welcomes the CFTC’s
announcement of proposed rules and will follow their
development with great interest.100
Needless to say, this finding and recommendation came too late for the
customers who saw their funds comingled with MF Global’s and then
disappear in the process. The reason why the CFTC may have allowed the
riskier Alternative Method may have been due to industry pressure from
futures merchants who preferred to operate at a higher risk profile. As noted
by one scholar who discussed proposed regulatory changes in the related area
of net capital requirements in the futures industry:
The viability of any change in the existing net capital rule will
depend in large measure on its acceptance by both regulators and
the industry. That acceptance will meet resistance. First, the
industry will oppose any requirement that increases capital over
98. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 95.
99. See Lynch, supra note 78 (explaining that MF Global pushed the NY Fed to expedite
its application for primary dealer status, but the NY Fed delayed approving the application
because of concerns raised by the CFTC).
100. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 91–92 (quoting In re Stotler & Co., 144
B.R. 385, 387 (N.D. Ill 1992)).
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existing levels . . . Consequently, the “political” obstacles to the
creation of a risk-based system are formidable.101
The CFTC’s allowance of the riskier Alternative Method may have
been the result of industry pressure to retain this method for those firms that
desired to assume greater risk in this area of the business. This preference
among more aggressive risk-taking firms likely impacted the CFTC’s
regulation as it catered to accommodate the higher risk tolerances of these
firms. In the process, the CFTC made compliance with the regulation more
ambiguous given that there were several methods to choose from.
There is also evidence that the multiplicity of regulators assigned to
oversee MF Global failed to adequately coordinate their oversight efforts.102
The congressional investigation report into the demise of MF Global found
that there was
no record of meaningful communication between the regulators
regarding MF Global before the company’s final week of business,
even though [MF Global] was registered with both agencies. The
SEC’s and the CFTC’s failure to coordinate regulatory oversight
of the company meant that the agencies missed several
opportunities to share critical information with one another.103
This points to an area of administrative law theory that is particularly
relevant to compliance law. Administrative law scholars have recently
conceptualized what they call shared regulatory spaces, that is, the
coordination challenges presented by overlapping and fragmented
delegations of power to multiple agencies and the mechanisms employed by
agencies to overcome these difficulties.104 According to these scholars,
so many domains of social and economic regulation now seem
populated by numerous agencies, which — to satisfy their
missions — must work together cooperatively or live side by side
compatibly. One cannot recognize this challenge using the singleagency lens that has been central to administrative law. It requires
an appreciation of shared regulatory space.105
From a compliance law theory standpoint, this suggests that regulatory
agencies face constraints related to institutional design that result in agency

101. Jerry W. Markham, The CFTC Net Capital Rule – Should a More Risk-Based
Approach Be Adopted?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091, 1108–09 (1996).
102. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 80.
103. Id. at 79–80.
104. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1133–36 (“Many areas of regulation and
administration are characterized by fragmented and overlapping delegations of power to
administrative agencies.”).
105. Id. at 1138.
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costs such as monitoring and coordination costs.106 This is particularly true
when agencies such as the SEC and the CFTC possess overlapping authority.
These challenges also extend to self-regulatory organizations (SROs), which
are private quasi-governmental self-regulating entities.107 In the MF Global
case, FINRA and the CBOE were the two SROs that shared regulatory
oversight of that firm’s activities, and they also failed to effectively
communicate with one another.108
Interestingly, the MF Global case reinforces one of the perceived
benefits of agency overlap in a shared regulatory space. That is, spreading
oversight among various regulators acts as a form of insurance since one
regulator may detect a compliance failure that was ignored by other
regulators.109 This occurred when FINRA took note of MF Global’s large
sovereign debt position and required the company to increase its capital
reserves.110 Other regulators such as the SEC, CFTC and CBOE had failed
to identify this mandated risk-based capital adjustment.111
Corporate governance law alone, therefore, fails to adequately account
for the various factors behind the compliance failure at MF Global. As the
systems theory of compliance will demonstrate, corporate governance is an
important piece of a much larger compliance law theory puzzle.
III. A SYSTEMS THEORY OF COMPLIANCE
This section introduces the first holistic portrait of compliance as a
dynamic, multi-party and interrelated system. The theory integrates insights

106. Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 2, at 1029–32
(“Governmental enforcement agencies and actors are also subject to the information and
coordination complexities that confront many regulatory agencies within the current
administrative state.”).
107. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 573,
583 (2017) (“FINRA straddles the line between a public and private entity. Although FINRA
officially remains a private, not-for-profit corporation, it plays such an integral-and
increasingly governmental-role in securities regulation that debates have emerged over
whether it should be classified as a state actor. The literature and case law frequently describe
it as a quasi-governmental organization.”).
108. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 23.
109. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1138 (“Yet from another perspective, redundancy
has certain benefits, like providing a form of insurance against a single agency’s failure.”).
110. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 54–56.
111. Id. at 50–52, 80.
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from behavioral ethics,112 administrative law,113 corporate governance,114
transaction cost economics115 and regulatory arbitrage116 from the perspective
of systems theory.117 After an overview of systems theory, each section
below discusses various conceptualized system units and their principal
compliance-related activities. These system units include regulators, firms,
executives and inter-organizational structures.
As prior scholarly research demonstrates, economic and normative
social forces exert pressure on individuals and organizational processes.118
The systems theory proffered here is the first to integrate the various units
operating within a compliance system and discusses their activities in relation
to one another. The systems theory of compliance is largely descriptive, yet,
as pointed out by scholars descriptive theory can go a long way to help clarify
and illuminate salient issues and provide the foundation for normative
analysis.119 As will be demonstrated, the systems theory of compliance
provides an integrated, generalizable and accurate portrayal of compliance
as it exists in practice.
Each actor within the system plays a critical role in the development of
compliance practice, law and theory. The three main variables that will be
assessed for each unit are: a) the practices that each unit undertakes to
promote or hinder compliance; b) the economic determinants of this
behavior; and c) the institutional determinants of this behavior that include
non-economic normative social forces.120
112. See, e.g., Haugh, supra note 2 (discussing how corporations can make small
adjustments to the conditions under which individuals make decisions in order to increase
ethical decision making by employees).
113. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65 (discussing the fragmented and
overlapping authority of administrative agencies and the challenges of interagency
coordination).
114. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2 (discussing the importance of prosecutors
considering corporate governance structures when investigating corporations and imposing
reforms).
115. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) (discussing “[t]he importance of
transaction costs to the organization of economic activity”).
116. See Fleischer, supra note 31 (discussing preconditions and implications of regulatory
arbitrage, a technique that involves legally exploiting gaps in the law to reduce regulatory
costs).
117. Lynn M. LoPucki, Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479 (1997).
118. See Oliver, supra note 59, at 697–713 (theorizing that both the economic foundations
of the resource-based view of the firm and the normative social pressures of institutional
theory impact managerial behavior).
119. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1137–38 (“Though much of the Article is
descriptive and analytic, its larger goal is conceptual. More than ever, it seems, a proper
understanding of the administrative state requires a fuller grasp of interagency dynamics.”).
120. See RICHARD W. SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 33 (4th ed. 1995)
(discussing how institutions are resilient social structures comprised of cultural-cognitive,
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A. Systems Theory
As the MF Global case illustrates, the practice of compliance is
impacted by various actors internal and external to the firm. This introduces
dynamism and complexity that requires a deep analysis of the various
interacting parts that constitute the compliance system. To analyze a system,
one must break down its various constituent parts.121 Understanding how
various constituent parts function and impact each other is a primary concern
of systems theory and analysis.122 As stated by Professors Belinfanti and
Stout:
[S]ystems theory is a design and assessment methodology
routinely employed in a wide variety of fields, including computer
science, engineering, biology, and environmental science. It can
be applied to any process (system) in which multiple elements
interact with each other, over time, to achieve particular purposes
or functions.123
Systems are complex interwoven tapestries that often elude definition
and conceptual separation from the broader environment.124 Scholars
recognize, however, that there are three techniques available to help an
analyst disentangle a system from the broader environment as separate
phenomena worthy of study. Those techniques are the human participant
test, the interaction principle and the purpose principle.125 The human
participant test simply asks who is grappling with the issue under
examination.126 With regard to the last two, Professor LoPucki states:
[T]he “interaction principle” holds that the persons and things that
form a system interact more closely and more frequently among
themselves than they do with persons and things in their
environment. Systems can be defined more or less expansively by
varying the degree of closeness or frequency of interaction
required to define a person or thing as included in the system. The
only limitation that must be observed is that persons and things
normative, and regulative elements that provide stability and meaning to social life.)
121. LoPucki, supra note 117, at 482.
122. Id. at 487.
123. See Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems
Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 579, 583 (2018) (applying systems theory
to the theory of the corporation).
124. LoPucki, supra note 117, at 498 (stating that “[d]istinguishing social systems,
including law-related systems, from their environments is often difficult. Social systems are
often interwoven in a rich, complex tapestry that can at first appear seamless. A single actor,
element, or subsystem may contribute simultaneously to the functioning of several systems.”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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with less interaction cannot be included if persons and things with
more interaction are excluded. The “purpose principle” holds that
persons and things that are necessary to the functioning of the
system-that is, to the accomplishment of system goals-are
included. Those that are unnecessary are excluded.127
Following the definition of these three delimiting attributes of a system,
this article posits that the compliance system is comprised of the dynamic
and complex relationships that interlock regulators, firms, executives, and
inter-organizational structures. Each of these conceptually distinct, yet,
interrelated units comprise a subsystem within the larger compliance
system.128
B. Regulators
A natural starting point to begin to analyze compliance as a separate
field of inquiry naturally begins with a theory of regulation and regulatory
agencies. Under administrative law theory, agencies derive their legitimacy
and regulatory authority from the legislative process.129 The consensus
among scholars is that regulations should strive to uphold the normative
goals of efficacy, legitimacy and accountability.130 Yet, the scope of agency
authority may expand or “drift” over time since under traditional principalagent theory, whenever Congress delegates authority to an agency, the
delegation will grant the agency some level of discretion that may change
over time.131
As the reactionary process view of compliance suggests, regulation
results from a political process and reflects the public’s desire to constrain
market activities.132 From an economics standpoint this may be done to
127. LoPucki, supra note 117, at 499.
128. Id. at 498 (“The structure of relatively distinct systems, each composed of subsystems
which are themselves composed of subsystems, is the natural structure of our universe.”).
129. See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 433–34 (1989)
(discussing how legislatures, in terms of policy from a positive political theory perspective,
are principals and agencies are their agents. This relationship thus triggers classic agency
problems involving monitoring costs).
130. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1997) (explaining that “[n]ormative claims about the goals of regulation are
either explicit or implicit in scholarly critiques of what ails the administrative state. Most
scholars profess commitments to both efficacy and legitimacy and therefore seek reform that
will produce high-quality solutions for which decisionmakers are accountable.”).
131. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1187 (discussing that policy drift may result in
shirking of responsibilities or the pursuit of expanded policymaking objectives not originally
contemplated by legislation).
132. See discussion supra Part I.
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lessen the negative social externalities created by a market failure.133 How
and whether those goals are implemented at the regulatory level requires an
analysis of regulatory behavior within agencies. The rich body of
administrative law theory provides a strong foundation to examine
regulatory behavior in practice.134
A key regulatory practice is to define the scope of regulation, taking
into account legislative goals and the legislative delegation of authority.135
The scope of delegated authority may depend on several factors, such as the
legislative intent to distribute authority among several agencies, judicial
decision making that contracts or expands administrative authority, and
bureaucratic policy drift that occurs over time.136 Additionally, agencies can
expand their authority through a collaborative rulemaking process such as
negotiated rulemaking. In the process, they may implement regulatory
innovations that result from the active participation and information-sharing
among impacted stakeholders.137 Professor David Zaring also highlights
how agencies may informally expand their authority and freedom from
judicial review through the adoption of best practices.138
A comprehensive analysis of administrative law is beyond the scope of
this article, however, the courts have generally applied the Chevron doctrine
to support the finding that an agency has discretion to interpret a statute due
to a statute’s ambiguity, known as step one of the analysis.139 Under step
two of the analysis, the judiciary will uphold the agency’s interpretation of
133. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1–44 (1960)
(discussing the role of transaction costs as the primary source of analysis for the justification
of regulation).
134. McCubbins et al., supra note 129, at 435–38.
135. This may trigger constitutional questions related to the proper role of congressional
delegation of authority to administrative agencies and the potential problems this creates due
to the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Related concerns involve agencies that
overstep their authority or interpret statutes in an overly-broad manner that, for example,
create rights and obligations that are not grounded in any intelligible principle and thus extend
beyond what a statute contemplated or authorized. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”). See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and
Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994) (discussing the design of the
modern administrative state and the gap between constitutional meaning and constitutional
practice).
136. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1139–43.
137. See generally Freeman, supra note 130 (proposing a model of collaborative
governance as an alternative to the model of interest representation in regulatory reform).
138. See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 324 (2006) (“Confronted
with a wide range of remedial options in a complex issue-area, regulators can rationally save
costs through the adoption of ‘off the shelf’ rules, such as best practices.”).
139. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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statutory ambiguity or silence as long as the agency’s interpretation is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.140 A recent empirical study
affirms that fairly deferential results occur when the courts apply the
Chevron doctrine to administrative behavior.141
Regulators are authorized to enforce the law; otherwise they will refer
cases to the appropriate enforcement authority. Enforcement authorities
have sole discretionary authority to decide whether to charge a company and
can recommend the penalties and remedial actions that should be imposed
and have the power to craft settlements.142 Enforcement authorities also have
the ability to design incentives as part of their discretion to cease
investigations and settle disputes. This can greatly alter the cost-benefit
calculation of compliance performed within companies. For example, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Federal Sentencing Guidelines are an important
aspect of compliance law.143 The guidelines technically apply only to
criminal enforcement actions, however, they have been vigorously used by
prosecutors to craft civil settlements.144 In the guidelines, the DOJ provides
reduced fines and penalties and the ability to enter a deferred prosecution
arrangement if the company under investigation has a well-defined
compliance program and follows what are deemed to be good corporate
governance practices.145 Regulators and the enforcement authorities do not
operate in a vacuum, however, as recognized by administrative law
scholarship. Several economic and social institutional forces influence their
behavior.146
1.

Economic Forces

An economic force that impacts regulators is the mandate to structure
or define regulation in a way that achieves economic efficiency. In the case
of federal regulations, it has been the case since 1993 through Executive
Order 12,866 that certain regulations should have financial efficiency as a

140. Id. at 843.
141. See generally Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts,
116 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing the Chevron doctrine’s application in circuit courts
and its impact on case outcomes).
142. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS (2018) (proposing a set of recommended penalties for business
organizations). See generally Cunningham, supra note 2 (arguing for the integration of the
role of corporate governance into prosecutions).
143. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
144. Root, The Compliance Process, supra note 2, at 215.
145. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 18.
146. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65 (discussing the challenges and benefits
of interagency coordination in modern governance).
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primary criteria and policy objective.147 For example, under Executive Order
12,866, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is
responsible for determining which agency’s regulatory actions are
“significant” and, in turn, subject to interagency review.148 Among other
things, significant regulatory actions are defined by that executive order as
those that “have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or communities . . . “149 This executive
order also requires agencies to provide an explanation of the need for the
regulatory action and an assessment of its potential costs and benefits.150
As economic actors, regulators are also subject to resource constraints
and limited budgets.151 This places stress on the ability of the regulator to
prosecute offenses. As resource-constrained actors, regulators must focus
on punishing those violations that will maximize social welfare and to do so

147. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. §
601 app. at 83–87 (2006) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 12,866].
148. See Stuart Shapiro, Unequal Partners: Cost Benefit Analysis and Executive Review
of Regulation, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10433 (2005) (describing the antecedents to the executive
order and stating that “President Jimmy Carter established the Regulatory Analysis Review
Group and issued Executive Order No. 12044, which, for the first time, required economic
impact statements on all rules with an impact of more than $100 million”).
149. Agencies must produce detailed cost-benefit analyses justifying major economically
significant rules as defined by section 3(f)(1). Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 147 §
6(a)(3)(C). The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has elaborated on
the requirements for regulatory review in detail in OMB Circular A-4. See OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/ [https://perma.cc/6S2Q-UP
GP] (providing the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) guidance to Federal
agencies on the development of regulatory analysis as required under Section 6(a)(3)(c) of
Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” the Regulatory Right-to-Know
Act, and a variety of related authorities). Executive Order No. 12,866 and OMB Circular A4 explain that the monetized benefits of a rule are not required to exceed its monetized costs;
the costs of the rule must only be “justified” by the benefits, including quantitative and
qualitative benefits. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 147 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. at 639.
150. But see Shapiro, supra note 148 (discussing how presidential administrations may
oppose regulations that meet efficiency criteria and support rules that do not); THOMAS
MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 61 (1993) (describing how the EPA chose a “realist”
approach over the more stringent standards that would have produced the most net benefits).
151. See Edwards, supra note 107, at 607 (stating that “[e]ven with independent, effective,
and competent frontline personnel, financial regulators may perform poorly if the ‘message
from the top skews their effectiveness.’ For example, an organization’s board may reduce
enforcement budgets or issue directives to expedite oversight examinations.”) (quoting Steven
Davidoff Solomon, The Government’s Elite and Regulatory Capture, N.Y. TIMES (June 11,
2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capt
ure [https://perma.cc/5DVT-RYKD]).
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they focus on activities that generate the greatest harm to society.152 From a
public choice theory perspective, regulators are rational, even strategic
actors.153 From this perspective, regulators may rationally decide to focus
their limited resources on easier-to-win cases that may be resolved quickly
and that provide high-profile victories that maximize political gains.154
Lastly, an economic force recognized by scholars in the area of
regulatory law and public choice theory is regulatory capture.155 Regulatory
capture is defined as “the misalignment of incentives of government actors
who pursue narrow private interests that may conflict with the public interest
they purport to serve.”156 In these instances, the regulator is coopted through
various formal and informal mechanisms such as hiring industry officials as
regulators, the use of revolving doors to reward regulators with lucrative
industry jobs, lobbying and social interactions that yield an unconscious bias
that favors industry.157
2.

Institutional Forces

Institutional forces also moderate regulatory behavior. One noneconomic force includes the mandate of public officials to promote the
public interest ahead of industry profits.158 This interest acts as a foil against
regulatory capture, since promoting the public interest is a norm held by
regulators who seek to ensure that the public aims of regulation take priority
over any particularized goals of industry.159 According to one theoretical
152. Baer, supra note 18, at 1049.
153. GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY, GOVERNMENT FAILURE:
A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 87 (2002).
154. See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 56 (discussing the motivations prosecutors may
have to settle a case using a DPA); Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize?
Evidence from Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379 (2005) (providing
evidence on the subsequent career paths of former U.S. Attorneys).
155. See Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in
Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 319–21 (1998) (discussing regulatory
capture of environmental agencies).
156. Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in
Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 630 (2012).
157. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 151 (discussing the social and ideological capture of
financial regulators and the difficulty of finding an adequate solution).
158. See Pierre Louis, supra note 44, at 40 (stating that “[t]he main purpose of federal
regulation is protection of the general public even to the extent of foregoing the extraordinary
profits”).
159. See Edwards, supra note 107, at 586 (“Ideally, public representatives zealously guard
the public’s interest and counterbalance industry influence within self-regulatory
organizations. To achieve this ideal, a public representative must have actual independence
and a true public-interest orientation. If, however, public representatives share the same
perspectives, beliefs, and biases as industry members, they may represent the public’s interest
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perspective, regulators are entitled to broad delegations of authority since
they are more insulated from the pressure of factions and can engage in
enlightened deliberations that further the public good.160
Another institutional determinant is the regulator’s scope of
discretionary authority. Broad delegations of authority buttressed by vague
or sweeping legislation provide regulators with greater authority to craft
regulations that have a greater impact on industry. For example, financial
industry regulators were able to resort to the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities and Exchange Acts and state anti-fraud securities laws, such as the
Martin Act, to broadly regulate entities that had exploited the regulatory
loopholes created by more narrowly defined statutes.161
The exercise of regulatory expansion may be an inherent aspect of the
system. Under the traditional principal-agent theory of administrative law,
whenever Congress delegates authority to an agency, that delegation
inevitably provides the agency with varying degrees of discretion.162 This,
in turn, creates the risk of bureaucratic drift away from the lawmakers’
preferences.163 The scope of agency discretion may be difficult to change
since agencies are granted high levels of deference by the judiciary with
respect to agency determinations and interpretations of law.164
Lastly, the political climate is an institutional force that impacts
regulators.165 Since the heads of regulatory agencies are for the most part
appointed by the president and serve at the president’s discretion, the broader
political climate will impact the culture and regulatory processes within an
agency.166 For example, the current anti-regulatory environment has filtered
with less vigor. At worst, industry-aligned public representatives provide only a veneer of
publicness, cloaking industry domination over a purportedly independent board.”).
160. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (arguing that agencies are better situated than courts and
legislatures to engage in deliberation over the public good).
161. See Pierre Louis, supra note 44, at 51 (discussing how these laws allowed regulators
to extend their regulatory oversight to previously exempt hedge funds).
162. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1187 (considering the varying degrees
of discretion afforded to federal agencies in the context of principal-agent theory).
163. See Pablo T. Spiller & John Ferejohn, The Economics and Politics of Administrative
Law and Procedures: An Introduction, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6–7 (1992) (discussing the risk
that an agency may deviate from the interests of the political coalition that created the agency).
164. See generally Barnett & Walker, supra note 141 (assessing the findings of an
empirical study on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevron deference).
165. See Shapiro, supra note 148, at 10437–38 (discussing the role of the OIRA to further
presidential agendas and commenting “[n]ow that the role of OIRA has been affirmed both
by Republican and Democratic administrations, its place seems secure: future presidents are
likely to continue to use OIRA to impose their agendas on regulatory agencies”).
166. See David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the
Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 419 (1997) (stating “presidents
exert more ex ante control over agency policy-making than does Congress, noting that
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to the level of regulatory enforcement through the appointment of regulators
who have a laissez faire attitude toward regulation and market behavior.167
On the other hand, political pressure may also induce the regulator to
pursue an aggressive plan of enforcement.168 This occurred shortly after the
mortgage crisis in 2008 and the enactment of Dodd-Frank legislation during
a pro-regulatory environment.169 Financial institutions were faced with the
issue of heightened compliance and spent considerable sums to comply with
regulations designed to monitor and ensure transparency and fair dealing.170
In these cases, firms must make investments in compliance or face the higher
probability of liability. As suggested by the reactionary process view of
compliance, however, industry efforts to challenge regulations through
lobbying may weaken these enforcement efforts over time.171
C. Firms
Under a theory of agency and vicarious liability due to employee
behavior, firms must comply with regulations or pay criminal and civil
penalties.172 As a result, firms are responsible for establishing firm-wide
compliance programs that are meant to prevent, detect, investigate and
remediate compliance failures.173 As the architects of internal policies that
digest regulations and internalize them to achieve the appropriate levels of
risk management, firms are also the decision makers with respect to the
broad compliance strategy that is to be pursued.174
presidents are endowed with Constitutional and statutory powers which enable them to control
agency structure. The power of appointment is the most important power, because presidents
can use this power to place political appointees in key agency positions . . . .”).
167. See Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal Deregulation of
Prudential Financial, STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (Dec. 2018) (discussing how the current
administration appointed federal regulators who eliminated oversight of all non-bank
systemically important financial institutions in contravention of statutory goals).
168. See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing the aggressive enforcement and
prosecution of Arthur Andersen LLP).
169. See generally Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 48 (analyzing the regulatory
response to the 2008 financial collapse and the hurdles posed by the regulatory response).
170. See id.
171. See Solomon, supra note 151 (discussing the social and ideological capture of
financial regulators and its pro-industry effect).
172. See Arlen, supra note 2, at 1–2 (discussing potential criminal and civil liability of a
corporation and its directors for employee misconduct).
173. See generally Root, The Compliance Process, supra note 2 (proposing a new method
for compliance within firms that focuses on the compliance process itself to fix various
compliance failures).
174. For example, some firms are experimenting with nudges as a behavioral compliance
strategy. See Haugh, supra note 2, at 686 (stating that “behavioral ethics nudging finds itself
on the cutting edge of corporate compliance strategy. Some of America’s largest and most
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Yet, what is meant by the firm and how does compliance impact the
theory of the firm? As discussed by Professor Sean Griffith, “[c]ompliance
thus presents a profound challenge to theories of corporate law and corporate
governance.”175 Is a definition of the firm in compliance law theory to
include large shareholders who have voting power, individual board
members who have the power to direct firm policies and activities, board
sub-committees entrusted with overseeing particularized compliance-related
issues such as auditing, the board as a whole, or top-level executives who
can impact corporate policy and strategy? A coherent systems theory of
compliance law should address all these stakeholders since they have the
power to impact firm-wide levels of behavior. Yet, from an analytical
perspective, a line must be drawn to theoretically define the firm as the
separate legal entity (principal) and those who have the highest level of
decision-making authority to direct the affairs of this principal entity, that is,
the board of directors.176
One of the chief compliance-related activities of the firm is to establish
a compliance culture and infrastructure that will ensure adequate levels of
controls and risk-taking.177 These responsibilities filter throughout the
organization and impact its agents and top fiduciaries in different ways. For
example, the top decision makers such as the board and its top executives
have the fiduciary responsibility to create and implement a sound and
reliable compliance program within the organization.178 As the Delaware
Chancery Court said In Re Caremark, “a director’s obligation includes a duty
to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting
system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do
so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable

respected companies see nudging as the future of their compliance initiatives.”).
175. Griffith, supra note 1, at 2079 (discussing how compliance subverts traditional
notions of corporate governance and theories of the firm since regulators and compliance
officers have supplanted the traditional role of shareholders, boards and executives in the
execution of corporate governance within firms).
176. See Griffith, supra note 1, at 2079 (“Seen through the prism of compliance, the
corporation no longer resembles a nexus of contracts but rather a real entity, subject to
punishment and rehabilitation at the pleasure of a sovereign.”).
177. See Root, The Compliance Process, supra note 2, at 218 (recognizing that firms are
not expected to achieve perfect levels of compliance).
178. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(establishing that directors have a duty to implement information and reporting systems, in
good faith, such that appropriate, compliance-related information would be brought to their
attention); Linda Klebe Trevino et al., Legitimizing the Legitimate, A Grounded Theory of
Legitimacy Work Among Ethics and Compliance Officers, 123 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 186, 195 (2014) (discussing the importance of support for
compliance within the organization’s board and senior executives).
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for losses.”179 The highest company fiduciaries are also tasked with setting
the “tone at the top” to instill a sense of values within the organization.
Those below will often look to these leaders for guidance and will emulate
the values promulgated at that highest level.180
These top fiduciaries also have the power to decide agency structures
that directly impact the compliance function within the organization. For
example, the board and chief executive officer (CEO) have the authority to
alter reporting lines among compliance officers. This can have dramatic
consequences, as seen in the MF Global case.181 As described in cases of
compliance failures centralizing the compliance function and burying its
reporting authority to another C-level officer other than the CEO can prevent
critical information from reaching the highest levels of the organization,
perhaps intentionally by willfully turning a blind eye.182
Company fiduciaries have the authority to impact organizational
compliance structures. For example, they may create a hybrid decentralized
compliance function that spreads across the organization and reports to a
CCO.183 In some cases, a regulatory agency may mandate the appointment
of a CCO. For example, the SEC requires this for investment companies
such as mutual funds and investment company advisors.184 Increasingly, the
consensus within the compliance industry is that large enough companies
across industries should create a separate compliance unit with oversight

179. Supra note 178, at 970. States other than Delaware likewise impose broad oversight
duties on top fiduciaries. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981)
(holding that “[d]irectors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the
activities of the corporation. Otherwise, they may not be able to participate in the overall
management of corporate affairs.”) (citing Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924));
id. at 822 (“Directors may not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and then claim that
because they did not see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to look. The sentinel asleep
at his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged to protect.”) (citing Wilkinson
v. Dodd, 42 N.J. Eq. 234, 245 (N.J. Ch. 1886)).
180. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72 HARV. BUS. REV.
106–17 (1994) (describing a values-and-integrity approach which rests on employees
governing their own behavior by voluntarily choosing compliance behavior because they
believe it is the best way to act).
181. See discussion supra Part II.
182. See generally Nelson, supra note 72 (discussing the problem of willful blindness
among corporations’ upper management and the resulting potential for coordinated
wrongdoing). This occurred in the MF Global case discussed earlier. Supra notes 82–83 and
accompanying text.
183. See Lee Usnick et al., Managing Compliance Functions: Decentralize, Decentralize,
or Hybridize?, 28 S. L.J. 201, 212 (2018) (assessing the potential for hybrid approaches to
compliance management and providing examples of this approach).
184. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers; Final
Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,720–22 (Dec. 24, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270,
275, 279).
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over general compliance matters.185 This decision will trigger additional
important considerations related to organizational design that impact the
effectiveness of compliance practice.
The creation of a separate compliance department will likely be headed
by a CCO.186 The question then is whom will this individual report to? In
an increasing number of cases, the answer is the CEO, yet competing
arguments can be made that the CCO should also have a reporting line to the
board of directors.187 In some cases, which are criticized, the CCO reports
to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Operating Officer (COO) or
Chief Legal Officer (CLO).188 A current debate in the compliance world is
whether the CCO should report to the CLO or demonstrate independence
from in-house legal counsel.189 A strong argument can be made that
relegating compliance issues to a strictly legal perspective narrows that
function and weakens it.190 Creating various levels of reporting is also likely
to increase agency costs and weakens the power and efficacy of the CCO.191
Savings can be encouraged through centralized compliance, yet,
oversight may be hampered if that unit is not given adequate resources to
monitor a sprawling organization with various moving parts.192 Decentralized structures may fail to achieve an effective compliance mission if
the head of that compliance unit reports to the business unit head or another
individual within that de-centralized unit.193 Also, decentralized corporate
185. See Usnick et al., supra note 183, at 205, 214 (discussing various approaches to
compliance management).
186. Usnick et al., supra note 183, at 205–07.
187. See Griffith, supra note 1, at 2101–02 (contemplating the CCO as a standalone
position versus a position reporting to a legal department or CEO).
188. See SOCIETY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS AND THE HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE ASSOCIATION, SHOULD COMPLIANCE REPORT TO THE GENERAL COUNSEL? 3–5
(2013), https://assets.corporatecompliance.org/portals/1/PDF/resources/surveys/908_0_908_
0_2013-compliance-gen-counsel-survey-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2YK-WFKC]
(reporting on a survey showing that the majority of respondents opposed a system in which
the compliance officer reports to corporate counsel).
189. See Vikramaditya Khanna, An Analysis of Internal Governance and the Role of the
General Counsel in Reducing Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE
CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 1, 294–300 (Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 2018) (arguing that
separating compliance from legal creates inefficiencies.)
190. Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization
May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 78–79 (2014) (expounding the arguments
for and against the departmentalization of the compliance function).
191. The previous MF Global case study is a prime example. Supra notes 82–83 and
accompanying text.
192. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT §
3.08, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019) (discussing the provision of
adequate resources for the internal-control and compliance departments).
193. See WELLS FARGO & CO., INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS OF THE BOARD OF WELLS FARGO
& COMPANY SALES PRACTICES INVESTIGATION REPORT 10 (2017) (discussing how a
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structures may create unintended consequences that impact compliance, for
example, an aggressive sales culture.194
At the firm level, top decisionmakers must not only conceptualize and
then oversee the execution of an effective compliance program and
infrastructure, they must staff this function appropriately and allocate
resources so it can achieve the intended goals of risk management and in
some cases value creation.195 As discussed by legal management scholars,
the quality of personnel can vastly impact the range of legal decision-making
options, and this also extends to the area of compliance.196
As an internal policy matter, strategic behavior can impact compliance.
For example, a firm may develop a compliance strategy that exploits the
agency overlap created by shared regulatory spaces. Part of the strategy in
these scenarios may be to pit regulators against one another or exploit
loopholes.197 This was manifested in the MF Global case when that
company’s executives tried to persuade the SEC to veto FINRA’s net
liquidity capital requirements.198 As scholars have pointed out, this amounts
to a regulatory arbitrage strategy.199
1.

Economic Forces

Various economic forces impact compliance-related activities
undertaken by a firm. One economic variable is the level of competitive
pressure facing the firm.200 It is often the case that compliance failures occur
decentralized corporate structure at Wells Fargo prevented senior leadership from properly
monitoring and implementing controls that would have flagged the pervasive account fraud
practices practiced at that bank), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/inves
tor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D4H-9B9D].
194. Id. at 7–8.
195. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT § 3.08
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019).
196. Bird, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
197. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1183 (noting that, “[c]onceivably, however,
regulated entities might sometimes prefer fragmentation to coordination, to the extent that it
allows firms to play one agency against another in an effort to weaken regulation overall, or
to forum shop among regulators”).
198. MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 52 (“When FINRA refused to change its
position, Corzine and other MF Global representatives took their case to the SEC, arguing
that FINRA was re-interpreting the rule and that a capital charge was not required.”).
199. See generally Fleischer, supra note 31, at 230 (defining regulatory arbitrage as, “the
manipulation of the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic
substance of a transaction and its regulatory treatment.”); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at
1185 (“Arbitrage refers to the possibility that regulated entities will seek to take advantage of
situations of shared or overlapping authority to get the best deal possible, or play agencies
against one another in an effort to drive regulatory standards downward.”).
200. See Langevoort, supra note 40, at 8 (noting that, “intense competition produces
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when an organization faces high levels of stress due to competitive threats.201
For example, the Ford Pinto design failure that foreseeably caused vehicles
to explode during rear impact collisions can be attributed in part to the
competitive threat of Japanese and German compact auto imports.202 If a
firm is facing a disruptive technology and sustains losses or diminished
market share this can trigger an internal sense of crisis that propels the firm
into reaction or survival mode.203 These environmental pressures can
motivate a firm to cut corners to survive. This, in turn, can lead to
compliance disasters.204
As with many other business activities, firms position compliance
within a cost-benefit framework.205 On the cost side, the potential of liability
from civil or criminal prosecution will impact the cost-benefit calculus of
implementing a compliance program.206 For some offenses, the fines can be
fairly significant, which will incentivize the firm to launch a more robust
compliance program.207
unethical behavior is another non-surprising finding. Competition produces both the
excitement of potential gain as well as the fear of loss, and so cheating goes up as the goal
gets closer but you are a step behind.”).
201. Langevoort, supra note 40, at 8.
202. Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed
Opportunities, in THE FORD PINTO CASE – A STUDY IN APPLIED ETHICS, BUSINESS AND
TECHNOLOGY 99–100 (Douglas Birsch & John H. Fielder eds., 1994).
203. See id. at 99 (recounting the culture within Ford at the time as, “[m]arket forces
(international competition) and government regulation (vehicle safety and emissions) were
affecting the auto industry in disruptive ways that only later would be common to the wider
business and social arena. They also produced an industry and a company that felt buffeted,
beleaguered, and threatened by the changes. The threats were mostly external . . . and led to
a strong feeling of we-vs-them, where we (Ford members) needed to defend ourselves against
them (all the outside parties and voices demanding that we change our ways.)”).
204. The MF Global case is illustrative of this. See supra notes 74–92 and accompanying
text.
205. See W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Behavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral
Paradox of Government Policy, 38 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 973, 1000 (2015) (discussing how
adopting a cost-benefit framework, businesses largely failed to comply with the burdensome
and expensive Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations since the
penalties for non-compliance were low and enforcement was weak); MICHEL CROUHY, DAN
GALAI & ROBERT MARK, RISK MANAGEMENT 480–504 (2001) (providing the example of
compliance with the law as a form of operational risk within firms and explaining how firms
may address operational risk in one of several ways and that the chosen method should be
based on a cost-benefit analysis.)
206. Very few firms are ever indicted for criminal offenses since this drastic penalty often
fails to achieve deterrence objectives. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 18, at 6 (arguing that
U.S. prosecutors no longer target corporations because the approach, “was not effective at
inducing firms to take the most basic actions needed to deter corporate crime”).
207. See Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 286–87 (2017) (arguing that corporate
compliance with regulatory mandates is a core concern of corporate governance).
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The firm’s risk appetite is another economic factor that can influence
firm-wide levels of compliance. Some firms exhibit a greater tolerance for
risk than other similarly situated firms.208 In these cases, risk-taking firms
will exhibit a more lenient attitude toward compliance than similarly situated
risk-avoiding firms. Firms that are risk-takers may discount the costs
associated with establishing a compliance program and opt to not make
compliance-related investments, sometimes mispricing the risk.
2.

Institutional Forces

Several institutional forces impact the firm’s compliance practices. For
example, the firm’s culture toward regulatory, legal, and ethical issues will
have a significant impact. Often, corporate culture is linked to either an
effective or ineffective compliance program.209 Corporate culture includes
“the set of shared beliefs and norms [within the corporation] that tells people
how to act when there are no formal rules.”210 The various cultures of
compliance range from disdain and avoidance, skepticism, grudging
acceptance, proactive behavior, regulatory strategy and ethical decisionmaking.211
Since it is related to ethics and public policy, compliance can also
impact what is known as a firm’s social license to operate. As stated by
scholars: “[a] company can only gain a [s]ocial [l]icense to [o]perate through
the broad acceptance of its activities by society or the local community.
Without this approval, a business may not be able to carry on its activities
without incurring serious delays and costs.”212 As an element of non-market
strategy, firms must pay careful attention to retain the public’s trust, since
failing to do so can lead to devastating non-market actions against the
company, including boycotts, calls for regulatory action, public shaming and
208. Id. at 331 (discussing risk-averse vs. risk aggressive firms in the area of compliance).
209. Paine, supra note 180 (discussing organizational integrity as the best approach to
achieve compliance with the law); Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of
Corporate Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 234–38 (2016) (describing
how a culture of integrity promotes compliance); see generally David Hess, Ethical
Infrastructures and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy
Implications from the Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317 (2016) (arguing that a
compliance program must be aligned with the organization’s culture to have legitimacy in the
eyes of the organization’s employees).
210. René M. Stulz, Risk-Taking and Risk Management by Banks, 27 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 8, 16 (2015).
211. See Robert C. Bird & David Orozco, Finding the Right Corporate Legal Strategy, 56
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 81 (2014) (discussing these varying approaches within the context
of legal decision-making).
212. Kathleen M. Wilburn & Ralph Wilburn, Achieving Social License to Operate Using
Stakeholder Theory, J. INT’L BUS. ETHICS 1, 4 (2011).
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loss of customer loyalty.213 In the worst case, a firm can lose its social license
to operate and cease to operate if trust is completely lost.214
Lastly, corporate governance practices and laws will impact
compliance practices.215 Corporate governance includes a wide variety of
internal practices that are a product of norms, history, culture, contract,
bylaw, charter, regulation, or statute.216 According to scholars, good
corporate governance practices include reducing agency costs between
owners of the firm and its leaders to avoid self-dealing or lack of oversight.217
Some of the mechanisms of good corporate governance include the presence
of activist institutional investors,218 the use of independent directors,219
separating the role of Chairperson and CEO, sub-dividing tasks within the
board and maintaining policies that protect whistleblowers.220
Corporate governance has a direct link to compliance. Recently, for
213. See generally David Orozco, Strategic Legally Bullying, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 137–
91 (2016) (describing potential adverse consequences of firms losing the public trust, which
often can occur to a weaker company when a more powerful company brings meritless
litigation against that weaker company).
214. See Tony Carter, Crisis Management for Sales Force Managers, 15 J. PROF. SERV.
MKT. 87, 90 (1997) (discussing the case of Sears Automotive Centers operating under an
aggressive commission system that resulted in customers being charged for unnecessary auto
repairs, resulting in comprehensive and severe regulatory action and the loss of consumer trust
that nearly caused the automotive centers to halt conducting business in several states).
215. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(involving the approval of a settlement agreement between Caremark and Caremark’s board
of director’s relating to a breach of duty in connection with alleged violations by Caremark
employees of federal and state laws and regulations); but see Griffith, supra note 1, at 2113–
14 (arguing that compliance law and corporate governance do not share common antecedents:
“[a]s a result, state corporate law has not meaningfully contributed to the development of
compliance. Whatever compliance may be, it is not a product of corporate law. Indeed, it is
more correct to say that compliance does what corporate law’s duty of care might have done,
had the business judgment rule not eviscerated duty of care jurisprudence. Compliance now
occupies the space left in the wake of corporate law’s retreat”).
216. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 7.
217. Id. at 8.
218. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 8–9.
219. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 873 (1991) (arguing that corporate
boards need directors who are both independent and accountable); see also Donald C. Clarke,
Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 78, 84–90 (2007)
(attempting to unpack and conceptualize the use of independent directors). Outside directors
provide the ability to render independent judgments and promote shareholder value. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1526 (2007) (chronicling
the use of outside, independent directors from the mid-twentieth century through the earlytwenty-first century).
220. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1022–23
(2010) (arguing that, “chief executive officers (CEOs) of publicly held corporations in the
United States are losing power to their boards of directors and shareholders”).
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example, a class action derivative shareholder lawsuit was brought against
Yahoo! directors due to their alleged mishandling of customer data.221 The
company settled the derivative litigation for $29 million to avoid potential
fiduciary duty liability.222 This settlement, the first of its magnitude, suggests
the company acknowledged there may have been serious compliance
oversight failures. Also, as mentioned earlier, the DOJ’s sentencing
guidelines link compliance-related liability to the adequacy of cooperation
and corporate governance practices.223 Scholars have also identified
attributes of board governance that can impact compliance. For example,
one study concluded that directors burdened by too many professional
commitments are detrimental for large, public companies since these overlycommitted directors lack the time and attention to provide the monitoring
and oversight that larger, more complex companies require.224
D. Executives
Scholars such as Professor Daniel Sokol have emphasized that
compliance means different things to different people at various levels within
the firm, such as board members, top executives and mid-level executives.225
What all these individuals share in common, however, is the need to
operationalize compliance at some level. The highest fiduciaries such as
board members under Delaware’s Caremark corporate governance standard
must ensure that there is an effective compliance system and have a duty to
monitor its performance.226 Top officers are tasked with ensuring that the
organizational design works, which often includes creating the role of a
CCO, ensuring adequate reporting lines to top decision-makers, and ensuring
that the system provides adequate information flows.227 Mid-level managers
are tasked with executing the program to ensure the law is followed within
the parameters established by the program and to report information to the
relevant officers who have authority to take action in the event of a
221. In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-md-02752 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 30, 2019).
222. See Kevin LaCroix, Yahoo Data Breach-Related Derivative Suit Settled for $29
Million, D&O DIARY (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/01/articles/cyberliability/yahoo-data-breach-related-derivative-suit-settled-29-million/ [https://perma.cc/4VF
G-FAP2] (claiming that, “[t]he Yahoo data breach derivative lawsuit is noteworthy in that it
represents the first significant recovery in a data breach-related derivative lawsuit”).
223. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
224. Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next
Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 899 (2018).
225. Sokol, supra note 12, at 401–02.
226. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
227. See Griffith, supra note 1, at 2101–02 (describing the role, responsibility and
importance of the CCO).
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compliance-related issue.
Non-executive employees who work on the front lines play an
important role in the execution of compliance at an operational level. They
are important sources of risk, information and feedback within the firm
subsystem since they can report violations internally up the chain of
command.228 Frontline employees are also an important source of
information feedback within the entire compliance system, and the law
recognizes and protects this useful role. For example, employment law
doctrines such as the public policy exception protect whistleblowers who
report a violation to a public authority.229 Specific statutes also protect this
source of feedback through mandated anti-retaliation protections that are
designed to encourage whistleblowing.230
1.

Economic Forces

As the literature points out, economic forces impact executives in a way
that in turn impacts their compliance-related behavior.231 For example, the
economic pressure faced at the firm level will seep down to the executive
level since executives may be pressured by higher-ranked officers to deliver
results under difficult circumstances.232 These high-pressure environments,
where economic incentives can override ethics, often yield compliance
failures.233
228. See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 123, at 603–04 (discussing the role of information
feedback loops as important sustainability mechanisms within their conceptualized systems
theory of corporate law).
229. See, e.g., Keveney v. Mo. Military Acad., 304 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Mo. 2010) (holding,
in part on grounds of public policy, that an employee’s termination is wrongful if it results
from his refusal to perform an illegal act); Skillsky v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 1088 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that terminating an employee for his having a poor reputation can be an
actionable claim); Dicomes v. Washington, 782 P.2d 1002, 1006–07 (Wash. 1989) (holding
that the firing of an employee for her disclosure of potentially damaging information to an
overseeing agency was in contravention of public policy and constituted a wrongful
termination).
230. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1 (2014) (providing for
heightened anti-retaliatory provisions for whistleblowers and bounties offered under DoddFrank).
231. For example, the burgeoning behavioral economics literature on compliance
recognizes how psychology interacts with economic factors to impact compliance-related
behavior. See generally Haugh, supra note 2 (analyzing behavioral phenomena such as
“nudging” that can corporate compliance decision-making).
232. See Carter, supra note 214 (discussing how a difficult circumstance in which
automotive centers had to halt conducting business in several states resulted in comprehensive
regulatory action within the industry).
233. See Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Warned Workers Against Sham
Accounts but ‘They Needed a Paycheck’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/09/17/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-warned-workers-again st-fake-accounts-but-
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Executives with bounded rationality face cognitive costs
conceptualizing and executing compliance.234 For one, executives must
familiarize themselves with the language and culture of compliance, which
is largely based on law and may be difficult to comprehend by nonlawyers.235 Managers and attorneys, as scholars have pointed out, have
different mental models for processing information.236 This may become a
serious issue if the action undertaken by a manager falls within a grey area
of legal compliance and these scenarios may exacerbate cognitive biases and
rationalizations.237
Other economic costs may include the fines imposed on executives for
acting in a way that causes harm to the principal and is unauthorized.238 In
these cases, individuals may face personal liability for behavior that
generates a compliance failure. For example, twenty-two directors of Enron
and WorldCom paid $39.25 million out of their own pockets, unreimbursed
by insurance or the corporation, to settle suits against them.239 These
deterrent aspects of personal liability will factor into the individual’s
behavior and compliance efforts. On the other hand, incentives may also
play an economic role. For example, some firms reward managers for
meeting compliance-related objectives.240

they-needed-a-paycheck.html [https://perma.cc/LHK9-EDP8] (discussing the aggressive
sales culture at Wells Fargo that contributed to a massive compliance failure at that bank).
234. See generally Langevoort, supra note 40 (analyzing behavioral economics and the
effects of compliance on behavior).
235. See Freeman, supra note 130, at 16 (stating that “ . . . as drafted by the EPA, permits
are primarily legal documents-they can dictate extremely technical and detailed effluent and
emission limits, as well as design and technology standards. These permits are often
incomprehensible to workers who must comply with them.”).
236. Bird, supra note 71, at 13 (discussing how lawyers are perceived as being overly
conservative, quick to throw up barriers, and more interested in legal technicalities than
furthering the goals of their client.)
237. Id.
238. See Associated Press, Enron Sentences Will Be Tied to Investor Losses, NBC NEWS
(May 26, 2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12993408/ns/business-corporate_scand als/t/en
ron-sentences-will-be-tied-investor-losses/#.XeQzdehKjD4 [https://perma.cc/R393-TPLA]
(discussing the fines imposed on executives convicted in the Enron scandal for crimes such
as money laundering and wire fraud).
239. Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1069–70 (2006).
240. Usnick et al., supra note 183 (describing how Walmart has implemented a
compensation system directly related to compliance objectives).
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Institutional Forces

Scholars have identified various cognitive biases or rationalizations that
impact individual-level decision-making within organizations.241 These
rationalizations impact an executive’s compliance with the law.242 Biases of
all kinds enable bad behavior such as unconscious biases that promote
unethical or illegal choices based on economic incentives or groupthink.243
Emotional numbing due to routines in a high-pressure environment can lead
to ethical lapses and compliance failures.244 Other biases include
underestimating the injury caused by illegal behavior, and discounting the
chances of causing harm or being caught by a regulator.245
Ethics plays an important role in business decision making, and this
includes compliance.246 Whistleblowers, for example, are lauded as ethical
champions who risk retribution and being shunned for speaking out and
doing what is right.247 Prominent scholars identify ethics as the main driver
for compliance with the law.248
E. Inter-Organizational Structures
Compliance is also impacted by structures and relationships that extend
beyond the firm’s boundaries or the regulator-regulated entity dyad. For
example, agencies with regulatory overlap must forge relationships within a

241. See Haugh, supra note 7, at 1255–58 (listing eight of the most prominent
rationalizations used by corporate offenders).
242. Id.
243. See generally Langevoort, supra note 40 (analyzing behavioral economics and the
effects of compliance on behavior).
244. See id. (noting that “[s]uch forces as stress and tiredness (so common in the business
setting) weaken the ability to resist, as can repetitive acts of goodness. The assumption here
is that being selfish is the more automatic process, which deliberation has to override, and
that takes a cognitive toll.”).
245. See Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 205, at 989–90 (discussing how systematic biases
lead to small risks being overestimated and large risks being underestimated.)
246. The field of behavioral ethics analyzes the choices individuals make to either promote
or hinder ethical decision making. See Haugh, supra note 2 (discussing behavioral
phenomena that can affect corporate compliance).
247. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s
Anti-Retaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 721, 755 (2014)
(stating whistleblowers speak out about issues their superiors would rather avoid, creating
resistance towards the whistleblower); Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention, Detection, and
Whistleblowing: Principles for Designing Effective Reporting Systems, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 37,
51 (2012) (noting studies indicate that the attitude of managers plays a pivotal role in shaping
the ethical conduct of employees, such as reporting misconduct).
248. Paine, supra note 180.
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shared regulatory space.249 These regulators face monitoring and
coordination costs that impact the regulated entities’ cost of compliance due
to greater regulatory demands.250 Regulators in a shared regulatory space
thus may increase the potential for evasion, or regulatory arbitrage.251 As
noted by scholars, “regulated entities might sometimes prefer fragmentation
to coordination, to the extent that it allows firms to play one agency against
another in an effort to weaken regulation overall, or to forum shop among
regulators.”252
Another type of inter-organizational structure involves contracting. For
example, indemnification and insurance contracts play a role in compliance
since they effectively price the risk of non-compliance and transfer this risk
to a third party. If transaction costs are low, under transaction cost
economics theory parties will outsource this risk to a third party in the most
efficient way possible.253
Third party organizational structures play an important although underappreciated role in compliance law theory. For example, firms may join an
umbrella organization that self-regulates the industry through a selfregulating organization (SRO).254 Some quasi-governmental SROs such as
FINRA may even have the stamp of public legitimacy and authority due to
their authority derived from public agencies, in this case the SEC.255 Interfirm committees such as the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) can create private industry-wide regulations
that normatively induce firms to follow compliance best practices.256 Trade
associations of various types are designed to overcome collective action
problems and coordination costs to effectively lobby regulators or file
249. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65 (analyzing the persistence and impact
of shared regulatory spaces).
250. Multiple regulators within a shared regulatory space, however, increase the costs of
compliance. See generally Elizabeth F. Brown, The New Laws and Regulations for Financial
Conglomerates: Will They Better Manage the Risks than the Previous Ones?, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 1339 (2011) (discussing the overwhelming complexity of financial regulation).
251. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1183 (“Coordination also has the potential to
reduce the costs of participation in the regulatory process for interest groups and regulated
firms. Private transaction costs can be reduced by harmonizing inconsistent regulatory
approaches where agencies have overlapping jurisdiction, or by simplifying and integrating
related jurisdictional assignments.”).
252. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1183.
253. See Williamson, supra note 115 (describing transaction cost economics and efficient
contracting).
254. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2013) (describing SROs as “private police officers”).
255. See Macey & Novogrod, supra note 77, at 971 (discussing FINRA principles that
give it the appearance of authority to compel rule following and sanctioning).
256. COSO develops frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management, internal
control, and fraud deterrence. COSOS, www.coso.org (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
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amicus briefs during litigation. Lastly, firms may join professional
compliance societies such as the Society for Corporate Compliance and
Ethics (SCCE) to share best practices and information that reify industrywide compliance norms.257
1.

Economic Forces

The main economic forces acting on these inter-organizational
structures include coordination and transaction costs.258 Among regulatory
agencies, these costs arise due to regulatory authority overlap within shared
regulatory spaces.259 Coordination costs in shared regulatory spaces can be
lessened through interagency consultations, joint policymaking exercises
and presidential mandates.260 These coordination efforts will likely decrease
compliance costs for firms. As professors Freeman and Rossi state:
“[p]rivate transaction costs can be reduced by harmonizing inconsistent
regulatory approaches where agencies have overlapping jurisdiction, or by
simplifying and integrating related jurisdictional assignments.”261 If
regulatory coordination costs are lower than the benefits offered by private
self-regulation than efforts will be expended by firms to implement an SRO
that will oversee significant aspects of regulation within the industry.
Transaction cost economics theory applies to inter-firm relationships.
Under that theory, firms are expected to contract with third parties when
transaction costs are low and the gains of exchange exceed the costs of
internally-sourced production.262 In certain fields of activity risk can be
efficiently priced and contracts can be executed that effectively mitigate
compliance risks. The three contractual mechanisms that achieve this
include compliance outsourcing, indemnification and insurance contracting.
Compliance outsourcing is preferred to an in-house compliance strategy
when transaction costs exceed the benefits of in-house compliance due to the
knowledge specialization of third-party compliance specialists.263
257. SOC’Y CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, https://www.corporatecompliance.org/
[https://perma.cc/43W7-MKAN] (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
258. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65 (discussing the fragmented and
overlapping authority of administrative agencies and the challenges of interagency
coordination).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1155–69 (describing various instruments that can be implemented to increase
inter-agency coordination).
261. Id. at 1183 (providing examples of FTC and DOJ merger guidelines and the EPANHTSA joint rulemaking process as methods for reducing costs among regulated
communities).
262. See Williamson, supra note 115, at 250 (describing when it would be efficient to
make certain types of transactions).
263. See Meeting Compliance Challenges - Leveraging the Value of Outsourcing,
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Indemnification contracts impact compliance since they transfer the risk of
loss due to compliance failures to another party. Indemnification may be
negotiated between firms, as in the case when a subcontractor agrees to
indemnify a contractor for losses due to negligence. It may also arise from
a firm’s agency duty to indemnify fiduciaries and corporate officers from
liability undertaken due to business decisions. Insurance contracts may
impact compliance practices since insurers may limit or deny liability
coverage if weak or insufficient compliance protocols are in place.
Inter-organizational structures need to overcome coordination costs to
overcome collective action problems and the free rider problem. One
technique designed to overcome this problem is privatizing membership
benefits. For example, a compliance association may designate knowledge
or certifications that are exclusively available to its members. In the case of
lobbying, membership in a trade association, for example, may offer
members the benefit of providing input toward model legislation or preferred
access to policymakers.
2.

Institutional Forces

A social institutional pressure that impacts inter-agency coordination
includes regulatory turf battles. Regulatory turf battles can emerge due to
ideological differences among regulators, distrust, personality clashes or
competition for resources.264 This was manifested in the MF Global case
when the SEC and CFTC failed to coordinate their oversight activities and
left each other in the dark with respect to important matters that demanded
interagency collaboration.265
Social institutional forces that impact private inter-organizational
structures include business norms and isomorphism. Business norms can, in
turn, impact law and regulation. For example, trade usage within the context
DELOITTE CENTER FOR REG. STRATEGIES 1, 8, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pag es/re
gulatory/articles/managed-regulatory-compliance-services.html [https://perma.cc/2B5Z-F5K
C] (stating that “[e]ven with proper funding, an organization’s ability to scale up compliance
operations may be limited by the availability of adequately qualified people to an in-house
compliance function. In contrast, external providers focus on developing and maintaining the
required knowledge as a core competency, often by hiring former regulators and compliance
officers and developing industry-aligned talent pools.”).
264. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1186.
265. See MF Global House Report, supra note 74, at 80–81 (“The SEC did not include the
CFTC or the commodities SROs in the meeting it held with MF Global in June 2011 to
examine the company’s global operations and subsidiaries. That meeting, prompted by
MFGI’s continued losses and change in business strategy, would have been relevant to the
CFTC’s oversight of the company’s FCM business . . . . The CFTC, for its part, did not inform
the SEC that MFGI was using the Alternative Method to calculate its obligations to its
commodities customers trading on foreign exchanges . . . .”).
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of the sale of goods is defined by the Uniform Commercial Code as ”any
practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a
place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question.”266 Compliance-related norms
akin to trade usage have emerged at the industry level. For example, in the
information technology (IT) industry encrypting sensitive customer data to
prevent hackers from accessing the data has become a compliance best
practice, or norm in that industry.267
Institutional isomorphism compels firms to behave similarly and is
driven by professional societies promulgating best practices, standardized
codes of ethics and conduct, model laws, regulations and risk management
strategies.268 The ALI’s efforts to promulgate standards in the field of
compliance, for example, is likely to generate isomorphism.269 Best practices
can also be found in regulatory agencies and are used as an informal policysetting tool.270
The systems theory of compliance is visually summarized below in
Figure 1.

266. U.C.C. § 1-303 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977), https://www.law.corn
ell.edu/ucc/1/1-303 [https://perma.cc/YEZ9-43WY].
267. See Drjim, Do We Really Need to Encrypt Our Customer Data?, ACCIDENTAL
SUCCESSFUL CIO (2015), http://theaccidentalsuccessfulcio.com/security-2/do-we-really-need
-to-encrypt-our-customer-data [https://perma.cc/2CPR-PJRL] (discussing the importance of
encrypting data in order to protect customers in the case of hacker break ins).
268. See generally P.J. DiMaggio & W.W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147,
147–160 (1983) (analyzing how competitive marketplaces counterintuitively drive firms to
behave similarly and hypothesizing on the effects of these behaviors).
269. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
270. See generally Zaring, supra note 138, at 300 (noting best practices help regulators
make sense of regulation areas by being a more straightforward method of policy
dissemination).
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Figure 1. The Systems Theory of Compliance

F. Explanatory and Predictive Aspects of the Theory
This section summarizes the explanatory and predictive aspects of the
systems theory of compliance law. This section will also summarize the
interrelationships between the economic and institutional factors discussed
thus far and their impact on compliance practices. Additional cross-sectional
relationships that span the various units will also be assessed. These
propositions explain and predict a wide range of compliance-related
practices and provide a systematic, generalizable, and rigorous basis for
verification through empirical analysis.
1.

Regulators

Budgetary pressure is expected to have a negative impact on the
regulatory practices of enforcement and coordination. With less resources,
agencies have less ability to enforce the law and coordinate with other
agencies. Less resources will also likely trigger inter-agency competition
that may deter cooperation. Efficiency will be positively associated with all
regulatory practices since efficiency is a precondition of federal regulatory
implementation under Executive Order 12,866. If the regulation’s economic
impact falls outside of the ambit of Executive Order 12,866, then efficiency
is simply a normative aspiration that is not required. Regulatory capture is
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expected to negatively impact all regulation practices since industry
demands will seek to limit these regulatory practices in ways that weaken
regulatory compliance requirements. For example, capture may lead a
regulator to define ambiguous or watered-down regulations that are easily
circumvented.
Regulators who are motivated to promote the public good are expected
to positively impact all regulatory practices, since they all help achieve social
welfare. The level of authority delegated to an agency is also expected to be
positively associated with the regulator’s ability to define the scope of
regulations and enforcement. The political climate may positively or
negatively impact any of the regulation practices. Political climates change
over time and may veer toward heightened levels of regulation or to more
hands-off laissez faire attitudes.
2.

Firms

Competitive pressures will have a negative impact on risk management,
compliance strategy, and the firm’s compliance infrastructure. The Ford
Pinto example discussed earlier illustrates this point. Under pressure to
produce a subcompact car to compete with foreign imports, the Pinto’s
production schedule was shortened by half and safety concerns were
minimized. Lee Iacocca, the executive at Ford responsible for the Pinto,
imposed a rigid command that the Ford Pinto was not to weigh an ounce over
2,000 pounds and not cost a cent over $2,000.271 According to several
individuals at Ford “Iacocca enforced these limits with an iron hand” and
whenever a problem was raised that meant a delay on the Pinto, such as a
safety issue, Mr. Iacocca would “chomp on his cigar, look out the window
and say ‘read the product objectives and get back to work.’”272 This directive
placed meeting these strict operational goals ahead of safety and regulatory
concerns.
Under these conditions, a company’s compliance strategy and
infrastructure are expected to suffer since economic goals are prioritized by
organization leaders. For example, a compliance strategy of lobbying
against regulations, exploiting regulatory loopholes or pitting regulators
against one another may emerge in these situations. Also, the compliance
function may be weakened and starved of necessary resources.
The firm’s risk appetite will also have a negative impact on compliance
practices since higher risk tolerances will likely yield scenarios where
regulations are viewed as probabilistic events and hindrances to overcoming
271. Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 1977), https://www.mother
jones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness/ [https://perma.cc/Z692-7UVS].
272. Id. at 4.
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business objectives. Firms with higher risk tolerances are also more likely
to misprice the risk of non-compliance or discount the liability in these
scenarios. The prospect of fines or civil liability are expected to have a
positive impact on compliance functions since they alter the cost-benefit
calculus of maintaining a compliance program.
Sound corporate governance practices are expected to positively impact
compliance practices within firms. The compliance-related norms of
accountability and transparency are reinforced by sound corporate
governance. Conversely, weak corporate governance policies will likely
yield ineffective compliance-related activities within firms. Corporate
culture may yield a positive or negative impact on compliance. A corporate
culture that prioritizes honesty, respect, fairness, and transparency will likely
yield strong compliance-related practices. A corporate culture that values
profits and efficiency above anything else, even in the absence of
competitive pressure, will likely have the opposite effect. The presence of a
social license to operate on the other hand will have a positive impact on
compliance since this normative pressure will demand investments in
compliance-related activities to retain the public’s trust and consumer
loyalty.
3.

Executives

Internal pressure to prioritize profitability and cut corners will have a
negative impact on efforts to operationalize compliance. Incentives that
promote and reward compliance, on the other hand, will have the opposite
effect. For example, the DOJ’s Sentencing Guidelines and the whistleblower
provisions in Dodd Frank, the False Claims Act, and the Taxpayer First Act
codify this practice.273 As a result, some firms craft incentives and tie
executive compensation to positive compliance results.274 Another technique
is to tie executive promotions to compliance results and allow the CCO to

273. The DOJ Sentencing Guidelines state: “(6) The organization’s compliance and ethics
program shall be promoted and enforced consistently throughout the organization through (A)
appropriate incentives to perform in accordance with the compliance and ethics program . . .
.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(6) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
274. See Joseph E. Murphy, Using Incentives in Your Compliance and Ethics Program,
SOC. CORP. COMPLIANCE ETHICS 1, 21 (2011), https://assets.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/P DFs/R
esources/library/814_0_IncentivesCEProgram-Murphy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT8U-HSUC]
(discussing how at one organization “business unit leaders are rated on 25–30 elements tied
to the Sentencing Guidelines standards for effective compliance and ethics programs. Their
rating in these categories acts as a threshold for determining eligibility to participate in the
incentive program each year.”).
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provide input on this important process.275 Learning costs are expected to be
negatively associated with compliance. The threat of personal liability for
compliance failures will, on the other hand, have a positive effect.
Personal ethics is expected to have either a positive or negative effect
on the execution of compliance. Ethical values can vary significantly from
one individual to another. Whistleblowers, for example, illustrate the values
that would be positively associated with a heightened level of
operationalized compliance. Rogue actors who subvert compliance efforts,
on the other hand, exemplify the ethics that negatively impact a compliance
program. As pointed out by compliance law scholars, cognitive biases
almost always negatively impact compliance.
4.

Inter-Organizational Structures

All of the inter-organizational compliance structures depend on low
transaction and coordination costs, therefore, these costs are negatively
associated with those structures. Industry norms are expected to have a
positive impact on the practices regulated by SROs and reified by
professional societies.276 Regulatory authority overlap may have a positive
or negative impact on inter-agency coordination efforts. Turf battles,
mistrust, and competition will stifle inter-agency collaboration and hinder
compliance. On the other hand, effective oversight, trust, and cooperation
may yield an opposite and positive impact on shared regulatory oversight
and agency coordination.
5.

Cross-sectional Analysis

Thus far, the analysis has treated each conceptualized unit as a silo.
However, the units are interlinked across all four levels and impact one
another in various ways. For example, a regulator’s definition of a regulation
will impact the learning costs of individual executives. As the MF Global
case demonstrates, the CFTC’s allowance of the Alternative Method
supported MF Global’s aggressive compliance strategy and may have
275. Id. at 23–24 (discussing how the Sentencing Guidelines also speak to this issue). In
this respect, the Sentencing Guidelines state: “(3) The organization shall use reasonable
efforts not to include within the substantial authority personnel of the organization any
individual whom the organization knew, or should have known through the exercise of due
diligence, has engaged in illegal activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective
compliance and ethics program.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(3) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
276. This is referred to as institutional isomorphism. See generally DiMaggio & Powell,
supra note 268 (discussing the various complexities associated with institutional isomorphism
as well as the mechanisms by which institutional isomorphic change occurs).
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enabled their faulty risk management practices. The CFTC’s behavior also
increased coordination costs among other regulators. Regulators who pursue
weak regulatory enforcement will also impact the risk management and
compliance strategy of a firm.277
A firm’s compliance strategy of regulatory arbitrage will impact the
regulator’s enforcement or coordination efforts if the strategy pits regulators
against one another. Likewise, a compliance strategy that weakens
regulation will impact the inter-organizational lobbying structure or SRO
behavior. As recognized by administrative law scholars, shared regulatory
spaces bring to light the importance of lowering agency coordination costs
and the effectiveness of this activity will impact regulators’ levels of
enforcement.
Corporate governance will also impact the firm’s compliance
infrastructure and executive behavior. For example, if the firm’s top
fiduciaries craft incentives that link compliance to executive compensation
or promotion, these incentives are likely to impact behavior and may counter
the negative effects of cognitive biases. These examples are not meant to be
exhaustive. Instead, they are meant to illustrate the richness and complexity
of interactions among the various conceptualized units that comprise the
compliance law system and explain various potential outcomes and causal
effects.
6. Law and Policy Implications
The systems theory of compliance and its analysis provide several
insights and prescriptive recommendations for the improvement of
compliance law, theory, and practice. An apparent finding is that compliance
law and practice involve complex activities among various actors that are
closely interconnected. Policymakers should therefore appreciate the
various interacting parts and the impact they have on one another. This will
guide better policymaking and avoid well-intentioned policies that achieve
negative unintended results.
For example, policymakers should avoid the temptation to oversimplify
issues and attribute a compliance failure to a single issue such as bad
corporate governance or a corrupt organizational culture. Enforcement
authorities should do the same, and this would cast serious doubt on
prosecutors who at times have demanded that individual executives be
terminated by the firm. As the systems theory demonstrates, removing an
individual is not likely to address the root cause of a compliance failure and
277. See Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 205 (discussing how adopting weak enforcement
regulations will disincentive firm compliance due to minimal noncompliance costs).
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may incorrectly place remedial emphasis on a single factor.
The systems theory supports the view of scholars such as Professors
Jennifer Arlen and Lawrence Cunningham, who argue that regulators,
particularly prosecutors, too often rely on off-the-shelf corporate governance
recommendations when they craft settlements with organizations.278 The
systems theory of compliance reinforces these scholars’ arguments that
regulators need to carefully consider the particularized and complex realities
within each organization to craft the correct penalties and incentives,
especially when crafting settlements that intrude on internal corporate
governance matters. As the systems theory of compliance demonstrates,
there simply is no one-size-fits-all approach to compliance issues. Carefully
crafted policy and enforcement actions should consider each element within
the system to narrowly and appropriately tailor a response in the event of
non-compliance.
Instead, crafting regulatory responses from a systems theory
perspective will likely yield pause and allow policymakers to more carefully
target the root causes of specific compliance failures. Otherwise, resulting
regulation that fails to recognize the interacting effects of the entire system
will impact an industry in a wholesale manner, generate unintended negative
consequences, and increase costs that may not be warranted, particularly
among firms who maintain an effective compliance system.
The systems theory of compliance is largely descriptive in nature and
does not, by itself, prescribe whether regulators should use controversial
enforcement mechanisms such as DPAs or monitors as a governance
mechanism. There is a vigorous scholarly debate about the appropriate
levels of intrusion into internal corporate governance matters though the
aggressive use of these prosecutorial and regulatory instruments. The reality,
however, is that regulators have increasingly used DPAs to settle
compliance-related cases, and this practice is not likely to abate. The systems
theory does recognize however, through its description of the various
interacting variables, that if these agreements are not carefully tailored, they
may do more harm than good.279 As the systems theory of compliance
demonstrates, there can be multiple causal attributes of a compliance failure.
All else being equal, if the cause of a compliance failure is due mainly to the
ethical lapses of a few individuals, this should be taken into consideration
when defining the penalties and remedial steps in a DPA. Likewise, if the
firm, for example, grossly miscalculated the risk and harm caused by noncompliance due to an aggressive risk-taking compliance strategy such as
278. See generally Cunningham, supra note 1; Arlen, supra note 2 (discussing the various
incentives and considerations that prosecutors incorporate into settlements).
279. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 54–57 (noting the potential harms associated with
crafting one-size-fits-all compliance mechanisms).
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regulatory arbitrage, this can be taken into consideration by prosecutors
when they craft penalties.
Alternatively, if there are various factors at the organizational and
individual levels that point to a broader disregard for compliance practices,
then a DPA should require harsher penalties and significantly more exacting
remedial measures that address agency costs and failed oversight among
various actors. The systems theory also supports the view held by scholars
that overly aggressive criminal enforcement against companies is usually
unjustified since this is likely going to overly punish the firm and will not
achieve optimal levels of deterrence.280
The analysis also suggests that regulatory behavior should be assessed
to determine if it is promoting or hindering compliance practices.
Prosecutors should, for example, examine if regulatory ambiguity or the lack
of inter-agency coordination played a role. For example, if the regulated
subject area involves multiple agencies operating within a shared regulatory
space, it may be that coordination efforts are insufficient or rationally
encourage a regulatory arbitrage strategy that frustrates the aims of
regulation. Prosecutors may also take this into account when crafting a DPA.
Also, in these cases, additional oversight from Congress, the President, or
SROs may be necessary to promote the broader goals of regulation.281
The systems theory can also inform improved policymaking.
Policymakers have various tools at their disposal to improve compliance
practices. Legislatures, for example, can craft legislation that broadly
delegates authority and allows regulators to craft rules that close gaps or
loopholes. The courts can likewise offer broad deference to agencies in this
regard. Administrative law rulings like the one in Goldstein v. SEC282 should
280. See Arlen, supra note 2 (noting the ways in which corporate malfeasance may be
heavily regulated by criminal law); Haugh supra note 2 (discussing the pitfalls of overenforcement of corporate noncompliance).
281. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 65, at 1173–78.
282. Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The
appellate court struck down a rule implemented by the SEC that would remove many hedge
funds from the safe harbor provisions of the Investment Advisors Act, which exempted from
SEC regulation “any investment adviser who during the course of the preceding twelve
months has had fewer than fifteen clients. . . .” Id. The SEC had interpreted “clients” to refer
to the funds themselves, but the SEC’s new Hedge Fund Rule stated that “clients” includes
“the shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries . . . of [the] fund” thus bringing
many hedge funds within the regulatory oversight of the SEC. Id. at 877. This rule and new
definition of client was implemented under SEC’s rule to increase oversight over hedge funds
due to large losses triggered by the speculative and opaque activities of hedge funds such as
Long-Term Capital Management. Commentators have noted that the appellate court’s
decision in Goldstein is at odds with administrative law and wrong on policy grounds. See
Recent Cases, Administrative Law – Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking – District of
Columbia Circuit Vacates Securities and Exchange Commission’s “Hedge Fund Rule”, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1394 (2007) (noting that the Goldstein court “not only departed from its
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be avoided, since they hamper flexible administrative rulemaking that
promote statutory policy aims and that should be granted deference under
Chevron. The legislature and executive branch also have the power to reduce
regulatory capture within agencies, for example, by limiting the use of
revolving doors.283 All too often agencies are led by former industry insiders
who, in turn, promote the negative impacts of regulatory capture as explained
by the systems theory. Statutory reform and executive actions can help
improve compliance practices and prevent this negative attribute of the
current administrative state.
The judiciary may also play a significant role in compliance law. As
mentioned by scholars, the courts can create duties that impact the
compliance cost-benefit calculus within firms. Delaware’s Caremark
decision was an important first step. As pointed out by many, however,
Caremark failed to live up to its expected effect of imposing personal
liability on fiduciaries for failing to implement and monitor an effective
compliance function. The subsequent case of Stone v. Ritter284 largely
inoculated the effects of Caremark. Only recently have directors faced the
specter of personal liability for failing to maintain adequate compliance
programs. State appellate courts, therefore, have the power to craft
heightened duties that impose greater personal liability on fiduciaries.
As the systems theory suggests, heightened personal liability standards
directly impact the firm’s compliance infrastructure, resulting in heightened
levels of compliance. The theory suggests heightened liability would impact
private ordering behavior. As long as transaction costs are low, insurance
companies are expected to price the greater liability risk and premiums in
relation to the firm’s investments in compliance infrastructure and
strategy.285
Lastly, regulators should perhaps focus their attention and resources on
the behavioral components of compliance practice as a regulatory strategy
that may yield the greatest benefits to society at the lowest possible cost.
Regulations, for example, can be narrowly tailored to impact incentives that
reward compliance behavior. For instance, several agencies have proposed
tradition of deferring to agency expertise, but also failed to advance the purposes underlying
the IAA. Further, the court missed an opportunity to allow agencies greater substantive
rulemaking flexibility in areas in which parties have the ability and incentive to escape
regulation.”).
283. Dodd Frank proposes majority of Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board to be
public representatives. Sen. John Kennedy R. La introduces proposed legislation to increase
director independence.
284. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (recasting board oversight duties related to
compliance as a duty of loyalty issue).
285. Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicting Governance Risk: Evidence from the
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 CHI. L. REV. 487, 489 (2007).
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rules under Dodd-Frank that “require that incentive-based compensation
arrangements for certain covered persons include deferral of payments, risk
of downward adjustment and forfeiture, and clawback to appropriately
balance risk and reward.”286 This proposed rule seeks to prevent perverse
incentives that generate excessive short-term risk taking that can, in turn,
generate systemic financial risk.287
On the enforcement side, DPAs may be most effective if they reward
companies that tie executive compensation and promotion to clearly-defined
compliance objectives. Scholarly research suggests that “there is some
experimental evidence that, at least for some kinds of decisions, people with
incentives can partially reduce cognitive biases through learning.”288 Some
companies have begun to engage in this positive compliance practice.289
Alternatively, a well-designed DPA may structure incentives as a remedial
action, particularly when other incentives such as aggressive sales
commissions or inflexible quotas lead to aggressive risk taking and
compliance failures. As the systems theory suggests, incentives impact
compliance-related behavior and can counter the negative effects of
cognitive biases. Along these lines, SROs and professional associations may
likewise mandate or recommend this as a best practice.
Adopting a systems perspective will impose discipline on regulators
and result in more efficient, effective, and legitimized regulation. The
systems theory of compliance allows policymakers to zero in on structural
weaknesses versus a strategy of wholesale reform characterized by the
current reactionary process view of compliance. For example, the
investigation of the MF Global collapse correctly identified particularized
weaknesses in the regulatory environment that justified incremental reforms
such as doing away with the Alternative Method. A wholesale regulation
that would, for example, increase capital requirements across the board for
all futures merchants would have been over-inclusive and had a punitive
effect among firms that were adequately complying with regulations and
monitoring risk.
It is important to recognize that the systems theory of compliance law
challenges traditional notions of the theory of the firm, including the view of
the firm as a nexus of contracts and as a conduit for stockholder wealth
286. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37680 (proposed June
10, 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-06-10/pdf/2016-11788.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/BP84-QG2K].
287. Id. at 37682.
288. Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 205, at 979 (citing Colin F. Camerer & Robin M.
Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-LaborProduction Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 34–35 (1999)).
289. Usnick et al., supra note 183 (describing how Walmart has implemented a
compensation system directly related to compliance objectives).
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maximization. Instead, the systems theory of compliance supports the entity
theory of the firm and justifies various stakeholder considerations in
corporate governance. From a normative perspective, this theoretical
vantage point may yield positive social outcomes due to greater efforts to
achieve compliance for the benefit of a multitude of stakeholders, including
employees, customers, regulators, communities, and stockholders.
An aspect of the systems theory that is critical to achieve these
normative goals is a general feature of systems overall, that is, the presence
of feedback mechanisms that promote system-wide goals and stability.290
These feedback mechanisms are primarily comprised of information
conduits within and among the various units in the system. For example, if
the firm’s board create incentives that reward compliance, corporate
executives will want clearly defined metrics to achieve those rewards.
Executives will adjust their behavior to meet those objectives and will
communicate their performance to multiple stakeholders including the
board, stockholders, and regulators. SROs, in turn, may mandate certain
compliance practices that will require disclosures related to effective
compliance practices. Whistleblower protections and hotlines are designed
to incentivize and protect information feedback related to potential
violations. Regulators may also encourage feedback by inviting industry and
external watchdog input through collaborative governance processes such as
negotiated rulemaking. Professional compliance associations may solicit
and contribute feedback through their promulgation of best practices. All of
these information feedback systems are features of the compliance system
and can help achieve the aims of regulation.
CONCLUSION
Compliance law theory is incomplete and in a conceptually
disconnected state. This article seeks to offer clarification to this seemingly
disparate yet growing and vitally important area of legal practice and
scholarship. A robust theory of compliance that seeks to better explain and
predict compliance-related outcomes is introduced through a compliance
systems theory. The systems theory of compliance conceptualizes the
various actors, institutions, and relations that impact compliance practices.
Currently, compliance is viewed as a process and this yields inadequate
explanatory and predictive power. The behavior and practices of each
conceptualized systems unit, comprising regulators, firms, executives, and
inter-organizational structures are analyzed in reference to two major forces
acting at each level: economic and non-economic institutional forces. These
290. Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 123.
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forces impact each unit and help explain compliance-related behavior across
all levels. This descriptive analysis in turn, yields insights and prescriptive
recommendations that will help improve compliance law, theory, and
practice.

